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In South African company law, shareholders remain to be the only stakeholders to hold a 
privileged position in the governance of companies because they are the exclusive beneficiaries 
of the director’s fiduciary duties. However, the requirement for certain companies to appoint a 
Social and Ethics Committee in terms of section 72(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 read 
with Regulation 43 of the Companies Regulations, 2011, arguably disrupts the traditional focus 
on exclusive shareholder protection by purporting to offer non-shareholder constituencies’ 
legal recognition.            
 These provisions require certain companies to report on how the operations of a 
company impact a broad range of non-shareholder constituencies including employees, the 
environment, consumers, suppliers, and communities.  In this regard, the committee presents 
as an ideal conduit through which it can sensitize the board of directors of companies to issues 
of national priority in South Africa such as job creation, adequate housing, anti-corruption, 
climate change, and access to health care.       
 However, the ability of the committee to deliver on its mandate and to address the 
concomitant issues of national priority is curtailed by a plethora of shortcomings and 
ambiguities.  The Companies Act and Regulations contain many contradictions as they refer to 
generic terms of reference regarding the committee’s role and they do not provide clarity 
regarding its powers, functions, objectives, and purpose. Furthermore, there is much 
uncertainty regarding the committee’s appointment by either the board of directors or the 
shareholders of the company.         
 This dissertation examines the philosophical foundation of the committee to determine 
whether it is conducive for protecting non-shareholder constituencies. The main objective of 
this dissertation is to examine the committee’s legal status and structure. This will entail an 
analysis of its duties, capacities, and incapacities to determine whether section 72(4) of the 
Companies Act read with Regulation 43 of the Companies Regulations is a viable mechanism 
that can be enforced to protect non-shareholder constituencies. This analysis is also conducted 
to identify gaps in the committee’s statutory formulation to develop and recommend a tailor-
made stakeholder protection model for South Africa.     
 Furthermore, a comparative overview of stakeholder protection in the United States and 
the United Kingdom is undertaken to determine how these countries protect non-shareholder 
constituencies and to establish whether there are lessons to be drawn that may influence 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Directors1 are vested with the authority to manage the affairs of a company2 and they were 
traditionally expected to do so in a manner that maximised shareholder wealth.3 Under classical 
company law shareholders have been the only stakeholders4 to hold a privileged position in the 
governance of companies in that they enjoy the exclusive right to enforce the directors’ 
fiduciary duties by instituting derivative action suits.5 As such, the interests of other 
stakeholders, namely non-shareholder constituencies, have held very little relevance.6 Since 
the 1930s however, there has been a movement towards the recognition and protection of non-
shareholder constituencies.7         
 The South African legislature arguably took cognisance of this paradigm shift by 
enacting section 72(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act)8 read in conjunction 
with Regulation 43 of the Companies Regulations, 2011 (Regulations). This provision requires 
certain companies to appoint a Social and Ethics Committee (SEC) and is considered to be a 
                                                             
1 In terms of section 1 of the Companies Act, ‘director means a member of the board of a 
company, as contemplated in section 66, or an alternate director of a company and includes 
any person occupying the position of a director or alternate director, by whatever name 
designated’. The phrase “occupying the position of a director” implies that for purposes of the 
Act, a person who is not formally appointed as a director may be deemed to be a director if he 
occupies the position of a director. And the phrase “by whatever name designated” implies that 
certain persons are regarded as directors even though they may be titled by a different name.  
This means that the name or description is not the most relevant basis to determine whether a 
person is a director – it is the substance of that person’s activities that will determine whether 
the person is a director or not. 
2 Section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
3 Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654. 
4 Despite the absence of a universally accepted definition of the term stakeholders, the term 
can be defined as individuals and constituents that can be reasonably expected to be 
significantly affected by the operations of the company. It has been suggested that corporate 
constituents who can show cause that they have contributed to the assets of a company via the 
means of one factor of production or another such as land, labour, capital or rent should be able 
to benefit from the protection which corporate law has to offer.  See Jean Jacques du Plessis, 
McConville & M Bagaric Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2005) at 24 
Also see Lee Roach ‘The paradox of the traditional justifications for exclusive shareholder 
governance protection: expanding the pluralist approach’ (2001) 22 The Company Lawyer 9 
at 18. 
5 David Million ‘Radical Shareholder Primacy’ (2014) 10 University of Thomas Law Journal 
4 at 1020. 
6 Irene-Marie Esser and Jean Du Plessis ‘The Stakeholder Debate and Director’s Fiduciary 
duties’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ at 347-350. 
7 Ibid. 
8 My emphasis. 
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remarkable stride towards the recognition and protection of non-shareholder constituencies.9
 The role of the SEC within a company can be described as the company’s ‘watchdog’ 
insofar as the company’s social and ethical footprint is concerned.10 The SEC can help to ensure 
that a company’s Corporate Social Responsibilities (CSR)11 are embedded in the core of the 
company’s activities and strategies to add value beyond making profits.12 The presence of a 
structured committee such as the SEC in a company not only serves as a critical co-ordination 
function but it can also help to ensure that the company is steered with an integrated perspective 
on business development.13 Further to that, the SEC serves as a means through which a 
company can efficiently and effectively manage risks deriving from economic, environmental 
and social settings that may have an impact on the operations of a company.14  
 However, the contribution made by the legislature in the Companies Act and 
Regulations as an effort to recognise and protect the interests of non-shareholder constituencies 
is counterintuitive.15 First, there is no express reference to the effect that the mandate of the 
committee is to monitor the company’s non-financial performance of the company.16 And 
secondly, the term ‘ethics’ is not mentioned in the Act nor the Regulations besides in the name 
of the committee.17          
 These two shortcomings represent many of the other ambiguities that render the current 
formulation of the SEC inadequate to protect non-shareholder constituencies. The next section 
of this dissertation examines some of the said shortcomings of the committee.  
                                                             
9 Helena Stoop ‘Towards Greener Companies-Sustainability and the Social and Ethics 
Committee’ (2013) 24 STELL LR 3 at 574. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The term Corporate Social Responsibly is underscored by the notion that directors are 
required to provide an account for the non-financial performance of the company. Despite the 
absence of a universally accepted definition of what is generally described as corporate 
conscience or responsible corporate citizenship; the term denotes the management of corporate 
affairs by achieving a balance of economic and social imperatives. See Dartey-Baah Kwasi and 
Amponsah-Tawiah Kwes ‘Exploring the limits of Western Corporate Social Responsibility 
Theories in Africa’ (2011) 2 International Journal of Business and Social Science 18 at 126-
127. 
12 My emphasis. 
13 My emphasis. 
14 Op cite note 8 at 564. 
15 Henk Kloppers ‘Driving Corporate Social Responsibility through the Companies Act: An 
overview of the role of the Social and Ethics Committee’ (2013) 16 PELJ 1 at 167. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Op cite note 9 at 578. 
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1.2 The Shortcomings, Uncertainties, and Ambiguities of the Social and Ethics Committee 
The inefficacy of the SEC stems from a plethora of ambiguities and uncertainties that emanate 
from the legislature’s poor formulation of section 72(4) of the Companies Act read with 
Regulation 43. There are virtually no mechanisms provided by the Companies Act and 
Regulations to ensure that the committee is anything more than window dressing for companies 
that may be masked as a marketing tool.18  In this regard, the failure to address the shortcomings 
and uncertainties regarding the SEC gravely undermines its efficacy and ability to steer the 
company’s CSR strategy.19  
1.2.1 The Requirement to Appoint a Social and Ethics Committee 
In terms of section 72(4)(a) of the Companies Act, the Minister of Trade and Industry may (by 
way of Regulations) prescribe the establishment of an SEC for certain categories of companies. 
The requirement for companies to establish an SEC will be determined by the Minister in terms 
of their annual turnover, the size of the workforce and the nature and extent of their activities. 
In terms of the Regulations, all state-owned companies, listed public companies and companies 
that have a public interest score above 500 points in the previous five years must have SEC 20
 It is not clear why the consideration of social and ethical issues is only limited to certain 
categories of companies bearing in mind that it would be prudent for all companies, regardless 
of size, to be concerned with social and ethical issues.21 However, one must also bear in mind 
that the Companies Act also prescribes for the establishment of other committees such as the 
Audit Committee and thus, it would be impracticable and expensive for smaller companies to 
appoint all prescribed and/or recommended committees.22     
 The Companies Tribunal (Tribunal) may exempt a company from the requirement to 
establish an SEC.23 Such exemption may be granted if the Tribunal is satisfied that the company 
has a pre-existing formal mechanism that already performs the substantial functions of the SEC 
or if such a company is required to have such a committee in terms of other legislation.24 This 
exemption may also be granted if the Tribunal believes that having regard to the nature and 
extent of the company’s activities, it is not reasonably necessary in the public interest for the 
                                                             
18 My emphasis.  
19 My emphasis. 
20 Regulation 43(1) of the Companies Regulations, 2011. 
21 My emphasis. 
22 Natasha Bouwman ‘Board Committees’ (2010) 10 Without prejudice 2 (2010) at 11. 
23 Section 72(5). 
24 Section 72(5)(a). 
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company to appoint a SEC.25          
 The exemption to appoint a SEC is perhaps aimed at reducing the administrative costs 
of maintaining such a committee and to avoid duplicating tasks within the company.26 However 
as mentioned before, given the impact which the operations of any company can have on the 
economy, it is questionable whether it is ever in the public interest for a company not to be 
concerned with its social and ethical footprint, regardless of the nature of its operations.27  
1.2.2 The Mandate and Functions of the Social and Ethics Committee 
The SEC has the potential to enhance the governance of the social and ethical performance of 
companies. However, there are various deficiencies and ambiguities regarding the mandate, 
role, and functions of this committee.        
 The mandate of the SEC includes monitoring and reporting functions. In this regard, 
the SEC is required to monitor the company’s activities concerning social and economic 
development; good corporate citizenship, the environment, health and public safety, consumer 
relationships and finally, labour and employment.28 The SEC is also required to monitor the 
company’s compliance with the 10 principles of the United Nations Global Compact 
principles; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development recommendations 
regarding corruption, the Employment Equity Act and the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act.29           
 The mandate of the SEC encapsulates a core component of good corporate 
governance30 because it plays an instrumental role in ensuring the protection of non-
shareholder constituency interests within the company. As such, the role of the SEC is to ensure 
that the company integrates both business and sustainability priorities in its practices so that it 
can thrive in an economy that strives to align companies with the principles of fairness and 
equality espoused in the South African Constitution.31     
                                                             
25 Section 72(5)(b).  
26 My emphasis. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Reg 43(5)(a). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Notwithstanding the absence of a universally accepted definition of the term ‘corporate 
governance’, the concept generally refers to the set of legal, cultural and institutional 
arrangements that determine how a corporation is administered, controlled and directed. 
Central to the concept of corporate governance is how the board of directors conducts itself 
and how it governs the company. Corporate governance is concerned with the relationship 
between the board of directors and other participants such as shareholders, employees, creditors 
and the community at large. See Op cite note 4 at 3-5. 
31 Act 108 of 1996. 
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 Furthermore, the mandate placed on companies to monitor the activities mentioned in 
Regulation 43(5)(a) arguably refers to the legal recognition and protection of non-shareholder 
constituencies such as employees, customers, environment and communities.  
 However, the legislature’s use of the word “monitor” implies that the SEC is merely 
required to keep a record of how the company’s activities impact non-shareholder 
constituencies and to observe whether the company’s CSR activities are carried out correctly.32 
As such, based on the wording used in the Companies Act and Regulations, it is not clear 
whether monitoring non-shareholder constituency interests is the same as legally recognising 
or protecting their interests.33         
 In addition to the SEC’s functions and mandate outlined above, the committee is also 
required to occasionally draw the attention of the board of directors on these matters as its 
members may deem necessary34. Furthermore, one of committee’s members is required to 
report to the shareholders at the annual general meeting regarding matters that fall within its 
mandate.35  
1.2.3 The Rights of the Social and Ethics Committee 
Pursuant to section 72(8)(b) of the Companies Act, the SEC has the right to request from the 
any employee of the company any information or explanation necessary for the performance 
of the committee’s functions. In addition to this, the SEC also has the right to be heard at a 
general shareholder’s meeting in terms of section 72(8)(e) regarding any part of the meeting 
that concerns the committee’s functions.       
 The right extended to employees in terms of section 72(8)(b) can be interpreted to mean 
that they are the only non-shareholder constituencies who may make contributions to the CSR 
strategy of the company. This places the employees in a position to make suggestions regarding 
how the company can protect their interests and the interests of other non-shareholder 
constituencies. However, this right is limited because it is not coupled with the decision-making 
powers to effect or to enforce the said contributions.      
 And pursuant to section 72(8)(e), neither do the members of the SEC have the right to 
enforce the decisions made by the committee as they simply make recommendations which are 
presented at Annual General Meeting. In this regard, the board of directors simply acquaints 
                                                             
32 My emphasis. 
33 My emphasis. 
34 Reg 43(5)(b) 
35 Reg 43(5)(c). 
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itself with the SEC’s report without necessarily making any useful implementation strategies.
   
1.2.4 Terms of Reference 
The Companies Act and Regulations refer to generic terms of reference regarding the role and 
responsibilities of the SEC.36 The powers, functions, objectives, and purpose of the SEC are 
not made clear.37           
 First, in monitoring labour and employment issues 38 as an effort to recognise and 
protect the interests of employees as stakeholders, the Regulations refer to non-existent legal 
instruments. According to Rossouw, the Department of Trade and Industry confirmed that the 
Organization Protocol on Decent Dork and Working Conditions does not exist.39 It is, 
however, possible that it was perhaps the legislature’s intention to refer to a document titled 
Decent Work Country Profile: South Africa (ILO 2012) 40 or perhaps the International Labour 
Organisation Decent Work Agenda.         
 The documents mentioned above are published by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) to guide companies and other organisations on issues relating to job 
creation, rights at work, decent work and working conditions.41 The legislature’s failure to refer 
to the two documents mentioned above instead of the non-existent Organization Protocol on 
Decent Work and Working Conditions negates the protection of employees. Thus, the members 
of the SEC will have to make a value judgement in selecting the various laws, codes, and 
conventions that may be relevant for purposes of ensuring the protection of employees as 
stakeholders within the company.        
 Secondly, in terms of regulation 43(5)(a)(i), the SEC is to be guided by the United 
Nations Global Compact Principles and the OECD Recommendations regarding Corruption in 
fulfilling its monitoring role. This prescription is rather peculiar especially when one considers 
that the Regulations refer to these internationally recognised corporate governance instruments 
                                                             
36 Op cite note 9 at 577. 
37 Irene-Marie Esser and Piet Delport ‘The Protection of Stakeholders: The South African 
Social and Ethics Committee and the United Kingdom’s Enlightened Shareholder value 
approach: Part 2’ (2017) 50 De Jure 1 at 229. 
38 Reg 43(5)(v). 
39 Dean Rossouw The Social and Ethics Committee Handbook 2 ed (2018) at 24. 
40 Ibid. 
41 International Labour Organisation ‘Decent Work Country Profile –South Africa (Pre-
publication draft) available at 
https://www.ilo.org/integration/resources/pubs/WCMS_232765/lang--en/index.htm accessed 
on 25 June 2019. 
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instead of national instruments.42 Kloppers correctly submits that the reference to international 
instruments instead of the local instruments such as the King Reports on Corporate governance 
in South Africa or the Guidance on Social Responsibility is a grave oversight on the 
legislature’s part.43 Reference to these local codes would have incorporated these instruments 
into our legal jurisprudence as soft law.44 
1.2.5 The Composition of the Social and Ethics Committee  
According to the Regulations, the SEC must comprise no less than three directors or prescribed 
officers and one of whom must be a non-executive director.45     
The requirement to have only one non-executive director on the SEC stands in stark 
contrast with the best practice recommendations of the King IV Report.46 The King IV Report 
recommends a higher standard for the SEC and suggests that the committee should be 
comprised of a majority of non-executive directors. 47     
 The membership of the SEC should be determined very carefully to ensure that the 
committee is comprised of members with adequate knowledge on issues that concern the 
protection of non-shareholder constituencies and to ensure that the duties of its members are 
discharged without unfettered discretion.48       
 The presence of persons on the SEC with CSR expertise or at a minimum experience 
with CSR will provide the company with an opportunity to balance stakeholder expectations 
in their decision making.49 Members of the SEC who lack knowledge in CSR will not be able 
to guide the board and mitigate the company’s exposure to social and ethical risks.50 
The primary motivation for having non-executive directors on the SEC is arguably for 
them to provide an objective judgement in the strategic management of the company in matters 
which pertain to the protection of non-shareholder constituency interests.51 This is because 
non-executive directors are expected to discharge their duties in a detached manner and to 
provide independent oversight over executive directors.52    
                                                             
42 Op cite note 15 at 173. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Regulation 43(4) of the Companies Regulations. 
46 Op cite note 9 at 575. 
47 King IV Report on Corporate Governance at 29-30. 




52 Howard v Herrigel 1991 2 ALL SA 113 (A). 
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 Having SEC members who are independent, not only in appearance but also in 
judgement is essential for purposes of fostering enhanced accountability for poor corporate 
performance.53 As such, the membership of the SEC should be determined very carefully to 
ensure that the committee is comprised of members with adequate knowledge on CSR issues 
and to ensure that the duties of the SEC are discharged without unfettered discretion.54  
 
1.2.6 A Comparison of the Social and Ethics Committee with the Audit Committee 
The Companies Act gives the board of directors the authority to appoint several committees55 
but the Audit Committee and the SEC are the only two committees prescribed by the Act.  
Although the Act gives these two committees statutory recognition, a comparison between 
them brings to light certain inconsistencies in the Act.56  
First, the functions of the Audit Committee are regulated by the Act itself and not the 
Regulations as is the case with the SEC. The intention of the legislature in this regard and 
whether there are any legal implications for regulating the mandate of the SEC via the 
Regulations as opposed to the Companies Act is not clear.    
 Secondly, the Act and Regulations do not mention anything about the skillset of the 
members who serve on the SEC. This position is strange considering that the skillset of the 
members of the Audit Committee is prescribed by the Minister of Trade and Industry in 
Regulation 42 of the Companies Regulations.      
 Finally, Section 94(2) of the Companies Act, makes it clear that members of the Audit 
Committee are to be appointed by the shareholders and not by the directors. However, pursuant 
to Regulation 43 of the Regulations, it is not clear whether the SEC is to be appointed by the 
shareholders or the board of directors. 
1.3 Problem Statement  
The overall success of the SEC is contingent upon four attributes that may be assessed to 
evaluate the performance of the SEC’s members in their role of protecting the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies. These attributes are composition, characteristics, structure, and 
process.57          
                                                             
53 My emphasis. 
54 My emphasis. 
55 Section 72(1). 
56 My emphasis. 
57 Shaker Zahra and John Pearce ‘Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: 
A Review and Integrative Model’ (1989) 15 Journal of Management 2 at 292. 
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 Composition refers to the size of the SEC and the mix of executive and non-executive 
directors who sit on the SEC.58 Characteristics refer to the ability of the committee to discharge 
its duties with unfettered discretion and the relative qualifications and experience possessed by 
each of its member.59 Process refers to the style in which the SEC executes decisions.60 And 
finally, structure refers to the division of power in a company, the efficiency of the operations 
the SEC and, the legal status of the SEC which includes an analysis of its duties, capacities, 
and incapacities. 
 
1.3.1 The Appointment of the Social and Ethics Committee and the Implications on its Legal 
Status 
As mentioned previously, the position regarding the appointment of the SEC in the Regulations 
is ambiguous. The uncertainty regarding its appointment arguably has a bearing on the 
committee’s legal status and the standard of conduct and liability attributable to its members.61 
As such the legal status of the SEC is the most prominent of all its uncertainties and 
shortcomings. Accordingly, the legal status of the SEC has been the subject of much debate.
 Esser correctly submits that there appears to be a lack of consensus in the literature 
available regarding the appointment of the SEC.62 Various commentators have different 
classifications regarding whether the SEC is appointed by either the board of directors and is 
thus a board committee or whether it is appointed by the shareholders and is accordingly a 
separate organ of the company.63      
 Regrettably, the Companies Act and Regulations do not state with certainty whether 
the committee is to be appointed by the board of directors or the shareholders. What is more is 
that between the Companies Act and Regulations, neither provide adequate mechanisms to 
ensure that once the SEC is appointed it does its job. In addition to this, ‘the most onerous 
sanction for not appointing an SEC is an intervention by the Companies Tribunal’.64
 Furthermore, Cassim correctly points out that there is no enforcement mechanism 
provided in the Act nor Regulations which can be enforced by the non-shareholder 




61 Op cite note 37 at 224. 
62 Ibid at 223. 
63 Ibid at 223-224. 
64 Op cite note 9 at 576. 
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constituencies that the committee seeks to protect.65 This means that there are no legal 
consequences for the SEC for failing to ensure that the protection of non-shareholder 
constituencies is embedded into the company’s strategy and objectives.   
 The absence of an enforcement mechanism stems from a failure to formally recognise 
non-shareholder constituencies as corporate constituents with enforceable rights against the 
company. As a consequence, the current formulation of the SEC as prescribed by the 
Companies Act and Regulations merely asks of its members to monitor the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies, it does not ensure or guarantee the protection of their interests. 
1.4 Objectives, Rationale and Scope of the Dissertation 
This dissertation examines the structure of the SEC to demonstrate how its legal status negates 
its efficacy to protect non-shareholder constituencies. The structure of the SEC will be analysed 
because the efficiency of the SEC and the ability of its members to protect non-shareholder 
constituencies will depend upon the enforceability of the rights which section 72(4) purports 
to afford non-shareholder constituencies.      
 Accordingly, this dissertation will investigate whether section 72(4) of the Companies 
Act read with Regulation 43 of the Companies Regulations is a legally viable provision that 
can be enforced to protect the interests of non-shareholder constituencies.   
 It is prudent to highlight that a critical analysis that would address all the shortcomings 
and uncertainties surrounding the SEC is beyond the scope of this dissertation. As such, the 
focus of this dissertation will be based specifically on the legal status and structure of the SEC. 
This dissertation will not analyse the composition, characteristics, and process of the SEC.  
 For purposes of this dissertation, the term non-shareholder constituencies, except where 
mentioned specifically, refers to stakeholders other than shareholders. Although shareholders 
form part of the broader concept of stakeholders, shareholders will be dealt with separately 
from all other corporate constituents that are also stakeholders.    
 Furthermore, this dissertation will not focus on a specific constituent of stakeholders. 
The focus will be on the contrast in the protection offered to the shareholders versus the 
collective group of non-shareholder constituencies. 
                                                             
65 Farouk Cassim, Maleka Cassim and Rehanna Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2 
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1.5 Research Question  
Can section 72(4) of the Companies Act read in conjunction with Regulation 43 of the 
Companies Regulations, 2011 be enforced as a legally viable mechanism to protect the interests 
of non-shareholder constituencies? 
1.6 The Significance of the Research Problem 
The advent of South Africa’s democratic dispensation was a critical driver for corporate social 
and ethical responsibility.66 The dawn of the new political dispensation in 1994 brought about 
a paradigm shift that affects the social dimension of the corporate law discipline in the 
country.67           
 In addition to this, South Africa’s re-entrance into the world economy following the 
atrocities committed by the Apartheid government underscored the need to reform the 
country’s corporate law regime.68  This transformation was a necessary effort to advance a 
sustainable economy that would meet the needs of its people considering that the poor 
governance of companies can serve as a systemic risk on the economy and the country as a 
whole.69             
 The Constitution, and specifically the Bill of Rights, seeks to ensure the common 
welfare of all South Africans.70 The Bill of rights contains a wealth of provisions that relate to 
workplace rights,71 socioeconomic rights72 and it also guarantees the protection of the 
environment.73 The protection of these rights is considered to be an issue of national priority74 
                                                             
66 David Bilchitz ‘Corporate Law and the Constitution: Towards Binding Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations’ 25 SALJ 1 at 772. 
67 Michelle Havenga ‘Regulating Director’s Duties and South African Company Law Reform’ 
(2005) 26 Obiter 3 at 612. 
68 Ibid. 
69 My emphasis. 
70 Chapter 2, sections 7-39 of The Constitution. 
71 Section 23 of the Constitution. 
72 Section 27 of the Constitution. 
73 Section 24 of the Constitution. 
74 In 2019 at the State of the Nation Address, President Cyril Ramaphosa highlighted seven 
key areas that the South African government would focus on. The seven key areas of focus are: 
economic transformation and job creation, education, skills and health, consolidating the social 
wage through reliable and quality basic services, spatial integration, human settlements and 
local government, social cohesion and safe communities, a capable, ethical and developmental 
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to as issues of national priority. See generally, South African Government ‘President Cyril 
Ramaphosa: State of the Nation Address 2019’available at 
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in as much as they are also matters which fall within the SEC’s ambit of responsibilities.75
 One of the main objects of the Companies Act is to promote and give effect to the Bill 
of Rights as entrenched in the Constitution. Section 5 read in conjunction with section 7(d) of 
the Companies Act encourages high standards of corporate governance, the responsible 
management of companies and reaffirm the concept of the company as means of achieving 
economic and social benefits.         
 As such, the introduction of a SEC as encapsulated in section 72(4) of the Companies 
Act reflects the position espoused in section 5 read with section 7 and arguably gives credence 
to the proposition that the protection of employees, the community, the environment and the 
concomitant issues of national priority may be taken into consideration by directors in the 
discharge of their duties.76         
 The protection of workplace, socioeconomic and environmental rights afforded by the 
Constitution presents binding obligations for companies based on the horizontal applicability 
of the Constitution.77 The Constitution not only applies vertically between the state and 
individuals it also applies horizontally between individuals themselves, which includes juristic 
persons such as companies.78 As such, companies can play a significant role in addressing 
issues of national priority such as the long term provision of health and educational services 
and the overall alleviation of poverty.79       
 The horizontal application of the Constitution thus presents a paradigm shift in the 
manner in which companies conduct their activities.80 In this regard, the SEC presents as an 
ideal conduit through which it can sensitize the board of directors to issues of national priority 
and the concomitant protection of non-shareholder constituency interests to ensure that the 
company does not fall foul of the provisions of the Bill of Rights prescribed by section 7 read 
with section 5 of the Companies Act.81  
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79 Hendrick Botha ‘Corporate Governance, Leadership and Ethics: Interrelated trio’ (2009) 25 
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80 Op cite note 66 at 756. 
81 My emphasis. 
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1.7 Research Methodology and Structure 
The research for this dissertation is analytical and literature based. The dissertation will analyse 
both primary and secondary sources of law. The central focus of this dissertation will be on the 
SEC pursuant to section 72(4) of the Companies Act read in conjunction with Regulation 43 
of the Companies Regulations.        
 Chapter one of this dissertation introduces the context within which the SEC operates. 
This chapter also establishes the background of the research problem and the significance 
thereof.          
 Chapter two establishes the philosophical underpinning of the dissertation. This chapter 
encompasses a literature review of the shareholder value theory versus the stakeholder theory. 
A review of the two schools of thought mentioned above is necessary for purposes of analysing 
and determining the approach undertaken by the Companies Act to protect the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies.         
 Chapter three examines the legal status and structure of the SEC. This chapter will serve 
as the crux of the dissertation as it will encompass the response to the research question, that 
is, whether section 72(2)(4) read with Regulation 43 is a viable mechanism that can be enforced 
to protect non-shareholder constituencies.      
 Chapter four contains a comparative analysis that investigates the various legal 
instruments used in the United Kingdom and the United States of America to protect non-
shareholder constituencies.          
 Chapter five will contain the conclusion, recommendations to the South African 











CHAPTER 2: THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE SOCIAL AND ETHICS 
COMMITTEE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The philosophical foundation of a country’s corporate law regime determines the overriding 
objective of companies operating in that particular jurisdiction and to whose benefit the 
company is administered, controlled and directed.82 Accordingly, the philosophical foundation 
also establishes the scheme of responsibilities to stakeholders that can be enforced. 
 In this regard, there are two general theories.83 The first is the shareholder primacy 
theory and the second is the stakeholder theory.84 It is important to highlight that the theories 
regarding the corporate objective represent a complex area of the law as there are many nuances 
and variations.85 Variations of the theories include, inter alia, the enlightened shareholder value 
theory, communitarian theory, and the pluralist theory.86 The variations of the theories are not 
sacrosanct but the shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory merely represent both ends of 
the spectrum.87          
 As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the overriding mandate of the SEC is to ensure that the 
company monitors how the operations of the company impact non-shareholder 
constituencies.88 This mandate arguably only offers non-shareholder constituencies’ limited 
legal recognition because of the absence of an enforcement mechanism that would have offered 
legal standing and protection.        
 This chapter analyses how the philosophical foundation of the SEC negates the 
presence of an enforcement mechanism. This chapter reviews the contrast in the protection 
offered to stakeholders by the shareholder primacy theory versus the stakeholder theory. The 
objective of this chapter is to provide critical analysis of the approach adopted in South African 
company law to demonstrate why and how the philosophical foundation of the SEC negates 
the protection of non-shareholder constituencies.       
 An analysis of all variants of the theories mentioned above is beyond the scope of this 
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Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 3 at 249. 
83 Op cite note 65 at 518. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Op cite note 6 at 355. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 See Chapter 1 at 5. 
23 
 
dissertation. As such, the analysis will be limited to the shareholder primacy theory versus the 
stakeholder theory and the enlightened shareholder value theory. 
2.2 The Shareholder Primacy Theory        
The modern form of a corporate entity entails that ownership and control are vested in two 
distinct bodies, namely shareholders who “own”89 the company and directors who manage the 
affairs of the company.90 As an effect of the divorce between ownership and control in a 
company, shareholders expect the directors to maximise their wealth by managing the affairs 
of the company in good faith and to act in the ‘best interests of the company’.  91   
 Accordingly, the quintessence of the shareholder primacy theory holds that directors 
are to give primacy to the interests of shareholders.92 Thus, the shareholder primacy theory is 
founded on the notions of private ownership by the shareholders of the company’s assets and 
shareholder wealth maximization to enhance economic efficiency.93    
 The ownership argument can be traced back to several cases which equated the interests 
of the company to be synonymous with the interests of the shareholders. In Greenhalgh v 
Arderne Cinemas Ltd94 the court declared that the company as a whole is essentially an entity 
that consists of all the shareholders. In Parke v Daily News Ltd95  the court equated the benefit 
of the company with the benefit of the shareholders.  And in Gaiman v National Association 
for Mental Health96 it was noted that an attempt to determine what the best interests of the 
company are, due regard must be given to the interests of the shareholders.  
 The phrase ‘best interests of the company’ has been interpreted to mean the collective 
interests of past, present and future shareholders. This narrow approach to conducting the 
affairs of the company was based on 18th and 19th-century judicial interpretations. 
                                                             
89 It is crucial to highlight that it is incorrect to refer to shareholders as the owners of the 
company. Shareholders own shares in a company which entitles them to several legal rights, 
shareholders do not own the company itself as an entity. See Rehana Cassim ‘The Power to 
Remove Company Directors from Office: Historical and Philosophical Roots’ (2019) 25 
Fundamina 1 at 51. 
90 Ibid at 51. 
91 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 at 306. Also see section 76(3)(b) of the Companies 
Act. 
92 Jingchen Zhao ‘The Curious Case of Shareholder Primacy Norm: Calling for a More 
Realistic Theory’ (2012) International Trade and Business Law Review 15 at 1-2. 
93 Ibid at 8. 
94 [1951] Ch. 286. 
95 [1962] Ch. 963. 
96 [1971] Ch 317 at 330. 
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 The English case of Hutton v West Cork Railway Co97 and the American ruling in 
Dodge v Ford Motor Co98 both advanced the shareholder wealth maximization norm. The 
rulings of these two cases provide authority for the strict utilization of the company’s resources 
to maximise shareholder wealth to the exclusion of other stakeholders. Therefore, in terms of 
the shareholder primacy theory, the shareholders are the sole beneficiaries of the director’s 
fiduciary duties.99  As such, the success of the company and the maximisation of shareholder 
wealth is the overriding objective for directors when managing the affairs of the company.100 
2.2.1 The Justifications for the Shareholder Primacy Theory   
The most common justification for the shareholder primacy theory is based on the archaic and 
incorrect assumption that the shareholders are the owners of the company.101 
 Another justification for shareholder primacy is based on the residual risk argument.102 
In terms of this argument, shareholders have a legitimate, direct and sole interest in the 
company’s financial wellbeing and executive interests, including the fiduciary duties of 
directors.103 As such, the shareholders are deemed to be the residual claimants of the company’s 
assets because they only receive whatever surplus remains when a company is wound up.104  
 Arguing against the stakeholder theory, Friedman contends that the consideration and 
protection of non-shareholder constituencies demands of directors to act as civil servants.105 
According to the scholar, the theory permits directors to make use of the shareholder’s 
investment in a company to promote and advance social welfare.106   
 It is submitted that the protection and/or recognition of the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies does not substitute the role of directors for that of civil servants. The stakeholder 
theory merely encourages directors, in advancing the interests of the company, to ensure the 
sustainable development of the company.  
                                                             
97 Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654 
98 Dodge v Ford Motor Co (1919) 170 NW 668. 
99 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch. 286 at 291. 
100 Cohen v Segal 1970 (3) SA 702 (W) 706. 
101 Op cite note 89 at 51. 
102 Lee Roach ‘The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder 




105 Milton Friedman ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ 1970 The 




2.2.2 The Shortcomings of the Shareholder Primacy Theory   
The assertion that shareholders are the owners of the company is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, the shareholders have no vested interest in the property of a company; shareholders only 
have a right to claim a dividend because their investment in a company does not entitle them 
to claim part-ownership in the property of the company.107     
 Secondly, the premise of the shareholder primacy theory misplaces shareholder wealth 
maximization at the epicentre of directorial common law fiduciary duties.108 This position 
inadvertently disregards the true purpose of fiduciary duties which is to prevent directorial self-
serving misconduct and to protect the company from the abuse of its separate legal 
personality.109 As such, the shareholder primacy theory contradicts the fundamental principle 
of company law that a company is a separate legal entity.    
 From the moment of incorporation, the company assumes a separate legal personality 
which is akin to that of a natural person and is thus incapable of being owned.110 In terms of 
Salomon v A Salomon111, the court opined that directors generally owe fiduciary duties to the 
company as a separate legal person distinct from the shareholders of the company. Directors 
are thus engaged primarily to be stewards of the affairs of the company and not to act as agents 
on behalf of the shareholders.112 As a consequence, it is only the company (and the company 
alone) that can enforce fiduciary duties against directors who fail to fulfil their fiduciary duties 
                                                             
107 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 550-551. 
108 Tshepo Mongalo Corporate Actions and the empowerment of non-shareholder 
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as set out in the Companies.113       
 However, since a company is an artificial legal person and thus cannot act on its own, 
the shareholders may under certain circumstances institute derivative actions on behalf of the 
company when the directors are unable or unwilling to do so.114     
 The reformed derivative action is embodied in section 165 of the Companies Act and 
thus serves as an exception to the rule that the company is the ‘proper plaintiff’ to remedy any 
wrongs done to it.115          
 In terms of section 165(2), a person (with legal standing and leave from the court) such 
as a shareholder, a director, a prescribed officer, a trade union or another employee 
representative can institute derivative action proceedings. Thus, it follows that shareholders 
(and a trade union or another employee representative) can rely on section 165(2) to enforce 
fiduciary duties against errant directors.       
 However, to this day there has only been one company that successfully litigated 
against its directors for negligence. That was the case of Niagara Ltd v Langerman.116 As such, 
given the paucity of successful cases in this regard, the shareholders’ (and employee’s 
representatives’) chances of successfully protecting the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies will remain to be seen.  
2.3 The Stakeholder Theory 
In terms of the stakeholder theory, the corporate objective is to ensure that directors manage 
the affairs of the company for the benefit of all stakeholders and not only the shareholders.117 
As such, all stakeholders are deemed to be beneficiaries of fiduciary duties.118  
 The stakeholder theory is premised on the act of weighing, assessing and balancing the 
interests of legitimate and identifiable stakeholders.119 The protection of non-shareholder 
constituencies is largely based on the argument which contends that the resources of a company 
should be utilized in a manner that benefits those who contribute to the capital of the 
company.120  Given the effect which the operations of a company can have on society and the 
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environment, directors are expected to steer the strategic direction of the company in a socially 
responsible manner.121 This means under the stakeholder theory, companies are required to re-
examine their profit-driven priorities by considering the broader context in which the company 
operates.122          
 This approach of managing corporate affairs consequently amounts to an equilibrium 
of economic and social goals by the company and is known as the triple bottom line.123  In 
terms of the triple bottom line, companies are required to incorporate three pillars of 
development (economic, social and environmental) into its business strategy in the pursuit of 
profit maximization.124          
 The most notable debate regarding the imposition of social responsibility onto 
companies took place between Berle125 and Dodd. 126 The discussions that brought this debate 
to prominence were ignited when the basic perception of the company changed.127 Berle, 
basing his argument on trusteeship, contended that since the shareholders are the owners of the 
company, its affairs should be conducted in such a manner that maximises their wealth.128 
Conversely, Dodd argued that the resources of the company should be used to address wider 
societal concerns.129 By 1942, both scholars acknowledged the legitimate interests of both 
shareholders and non-shareholder constituencies.130    
2.3.1 The Justifications for the Stakeholder Theory  
Due to the interdependencies which companies create, directors should be concerned with 
striking a balance between economic and social goals and running the company for the benefit 
of all stakeholders and not merely those of the shareholders.131 The alignment of the interests 
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of individuals, companies, and society suggests that maximizing shareholder value is not the 
only legitimate mission of a corporation and it holds, in effect, that companies ought to be 
governed and controlled with the contribution of, and for the benefit of, all stakeholders 
including the community at large.132         
 The symbiotic relationship between a company and the social realm within which it 
operates demands of directors to conduct the affairs of the company in a manner that is 
conducive for meeting present operational requirements, but without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their needs.133 The recognition of the interests of the wider range 
of constituents, and not only those of the shareholders, has an impact on the commercial 
viability of companies.         
 When the interests of the shareholders are made the sole focus of corporate governance, 
the performance of a company will be measured only by the benefits which accrue to 
shareholders. A probable consequence of this may be the negation of the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies.        
2.3.2 The Shortcomings of the Stakeholder Theory   
The stakeholder theory has been criticised for its lack of precision, the absence of an 
enforcement mechanism, and on issues regarding how to weigh and balance the various 
stakeholder interests that may sometimes be at odds with one another.    
 Keay argues that the recognition of various stakeholder interests may serve as fertile 
grounds for the roots of opportunistic behaviour on the part of directors.134 Such opportunistic 
behaviour may be used as an attempt to defend fraudulent decisions taken in the name of 
stakeholders.135         
 Another shortcoming of the stakeholder theory pertains to its enforceability. In 1932, 
Berle noted that the abandonment of the shareholder primacy theory will only be feasible if it 
is replaced with a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to non-
shareholder constituencies.136 As such, a major problem with the stakeholder theory concerns 
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the enforcement of fiduciary duties.       
 Mongalo correctly submits that under the stakeholder theory, the extension of fiduciary 
duties to non-shareholder constituencies means that a breach thereof can only be remedied by 
instituting derivative action proceedings (subject to certain limitations).137 This assertion is true 
because the company maintains its separate legal personality. Thus even under the stakeholder 
theory, the fiduciary duties can only be owed to the company and the company alone.138 
 Be that as it may, employees are arguably the only non-shareholder constituency that 
can enforce the rights afforded by the stakeholder theory in the Companies Act. This is because 
section 165 of the Companies Act indirectly extends legal standing to employees by permitting 
a trade union or another employee representative to institute derivative action proceedings.
 To commence with a derivative action a minority shareholder/s or another stakeholder/s 
needs to serve a demand on a company to protect the legal interests of the company or to 
continue legal proceedings. Be that as it may, the right to institute the derivative action suit can 
(arguably) also be extended to other non-shareholder constituencies provided that a legal 
interest is proved.        
 Concerning the issue of achieving an equilibrium of stakeholder interests, the greatest 
challenge would be to ascertain which stakeholder interests should receive priority when the 
opportunity presents itself. This situation may arise considering that the various interests of 
different stakeholders may be at loggerheads. Accordingly, such a situation would warrant a 
judgement call by the members of the SEC. However, this will depend if the company a SEC 
or if it has been exempted by the Tribunal. And if the company is exempted by the Tribunal or 
if the company does not have such a committee that performs similar substantive functions like 
those of the SEC, the board of directors will have to make the said judgement call.  
 In this regard, Esser proposes a ‘merry-go-round theory’ in terms of which the company 
is represented by the various stakeholder interests.139 According to Esser, the various 
stakeholder’s interests will have different weightings and ‘an interest that may be primary at 
one particular moment in the company’s existence may become secondary at a later stage’.140  
Esser submits further that the weighting to be attached to a particular stakeholder’s interest will 
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depend on the extent of protection offered in other statutes141  such as the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995 and the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998.   
 As such it is submitted that Esser’s ‘merry-go-round’ theory (as expressly advocated 
for in King IV) may serve a useful step in the right direction and can prove to be a useful tool 
for members of the SEC.142 On that note, it is further submitted that the ‘merry-go-round’ 
theory coupled with the derivative action proceedings143 may provide a viable mechanism that 
can be enforced to advance the protection of non-shareholder constituencies under section 
72(4) of the Companies Act. 
2.4 The Enlightened Shareholder Value Theory 
As mentioned previously, the enlightened shareholder value approach is a variant of the 
shareholder primacy theory and the stakeholder theory. The enlightened shareholder value 
theory was formulated by the Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG); a committee 
commissioned by the United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and Industry to oversee its 
company law reform process.         
 The essence of the enlightened shareholder value theory embodied in section 172 of the 
United Kingdom Companies Act 2006 which came into operation in October 2007.144  
 The enlightened shareholder value theory is predicated on the act of balancing the 
interests of various non-shareholder constituencies with the long-term view of benefiting the 
shareholders of the company. 145 In terms of this theory, it is permissible for directors to take 
into account the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in the discharge of their duties, 
provided that it is in the best interests of the company to do so.146 Accordingly, the enlightened 
shareholder value theory recognises and seeks to protect non-shareholder constituencies, albeit 
rather restrictively.           
 Under the enlightened shareholder value theory, a decision taken by the directors to 
benefit non-shareholder constituencies will have to be justified on the basis that it also benefits 
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the shareholders.147 And while the fiduciary duties of directors are still owed to the company 
under the enlightened shareholder value theory, this theory makes room for directors to 
consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies without risking a breach of their 
fiduciary duties to the shareholders.148  
2.4.1 The Shortcomings of the Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach 
The enlightened shareholder value theory does not embody a radical departure from the 
shareholder primacy norm because, as its name suggests, it is rooted within the shareholder 
primacy theory.149 According to Mongalo, while the enlightened shareholder value theory 
represents a significant development, its close ties to the shareholder primacy theory render it 
inadequate to protect non-shareholder constituencies.150 As such even though the enlightened 
shareholder value theory advocates for the recognition of non-shareholder constituency 
interests, the interests of shareholders enjoy exclusive protection.151    
 It thus follows that under the enlightened shareholder value theory, the recognition of 
non-shareholder constituency interests is merely instrumental in advancing the interests of the 
shareholders in the long-term. Expressed differently, in terms of the enlightened shareholder 
value theory, the interests of non-shareholder constituencies are merely recognised and not 
protected. As such, there is no direct responsibility on members of the SEC to have regard to 
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies because the members remain to be accountable 
to the shareholders.          
  The enlightened shareholder value approach does not extend fiduciary duties to non-
shareholder constituencies because they are still owed to the company and consequently the 
shareholders as interpreted in Hutton v West Cork Railway.152 This is by far the greatest flaw 
of the enlightened shareholder value theory because the pro-active consideration of non-
shareholder constituency interests is not accompanied by an enforcement mechanism to remedy 
the company’s failure to consider their interests.153      
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 For a corporate governance model to be effective to advance the protection of non-
shareholder constituency interests, there must be an enforcement mechanism that guarantees a 
remedy for a breach of duty.154 And although section 7 read in conjunction with section 72(4) 
of the Companies implicitly imposes a duty on directors to consider and protect non-
shareholder constituencies, the prospects of successfully enforcing an implicit duty seems 
unlikely.155 
2.5 The Position in South Africa  
The legal recognition of non-shareholder constituencies in South Africa is provided by partly 
mandatory and partly voluntary legal instruments.156 The Companies Act regulates the 
mandatory position whereas the King Reports on Good Corporate Governance in South Africa 
contain important recommendations regarding the protection and recognition of non-
shareholder constituencies although its application is limited to companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).157 The next part of this chapter analyses the theory 
adopted in South Africa’s mandatory and voluntary corporate law regime. 
2.5.1 The Emergence of the Enlightened Shareholder Value Theory in South Africa  
In 2004, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published a policy document which 
facilitated the reform process of South Africa’s company law regime. The need for reform was 
necessitated by the recognition of the interdependencies of companies and the social realm 
within which they operate.158 The failures of companies in other countries also contributed to 
the need for higher standards of corporate governance, ethics, transparency, and accountability 
of companies.159 As such, these fundamental changes and events underscored the need for the 
adoption of a new Companies Act that was reflective of the country’s economic, social and 
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political transition to a new democratic dispensation.160     
 To a large degree, the reform process was motivated by the need to enact a new 
Companies Act that would align with the principles of fairness and equality espoused in the 
South African Constitution as the supreme law of the country. 161 It was also necessary to enact 
a new companies Act that was consistent with other pieces of legislation such as the 
Employment Equity Act162 and the various environmental regulations163 which echo the spirit 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.164     
 The DTI recommended the enlightened shareholder value theory as the theoretical 
foundation of the new Companies Act165 and consequently the SEC. According to the DTI, the 
adoption of the enlightened shareholder value approach would only necessitate minuscule 
reform since the approach is not dependent on any change in the ultimate objective of 
companies, that is, shareholder wealth maximisation.166     
 Thus in light of South Africa’s unique context, the DTI considered the adoption of the 
enlightened shareholder value theory as the best philosophical foundation for the Companies 
Act, the citizens of South Africa and to give effect to the mandate of the Constitution.167 The 
DTI also considered this theory to be the best way to protect the inflow of shareholder 
investment (Foreign Direct Investment) into the country because the shareholders may be 
hesitant to address socio-economic issues unless they are doing it under the guise of 
shareholder primacy theory.168   
2.5.2 The Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
Following the issue and publication of the policy document and the subsequent draft 
Companies Bill which was published in 2008 by the DTI, the Companies Act of 2008 and 
Companies Regulations, 2011 came into force on 1 May 2011.    
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 Unlike its predecessors, the Companies Act arguably echoes a slight deviation from the 
traditional and narrow interpretation of the term ‘best interests of the company’.169 However, 
Esser opines that the wording in section 76(3)(b) could have been clearer because the current 
wording of this provision creates the impression that shareholder primacy has been retained.170 
According to Stoop, the Companies Act does not provide an amendment of the phrase ‘best 
interests of the company’ and as such, the phrase will remain to be interpreted as the collective 
interests of shareholders. 171         
 It is submitted that the practical difficulties associated with interpreting the notion of 
‘best interests of the company’ in a manner that enhances the social welfare considerations of 
companies gravely undermine the ability of the SEC to address issues of national priority and 
the concomitant protection of non-shareholder constituency interests.    
 To truly give effect to section 5(1) of the Companies Act, the interpretation of section 
7(d) may demand a wider meaning to the phrase ‘best interests of the company’ to include non-
shareholder constituencies. 172       
 Based on the analysis above, the theory adopted in the Companies Act is unclear but it 
appears that the foundation of the Companies Act as a whole (and consequently the SEC) is 
one that is “in-between” the shareholder primacy theory and enlightened shareholder value 
theory.173           
 This is because there is no formal legal recognition of non-shareholder constituencies 
in the Act. The only echoes of the enlightened shareholder value approach are to be found in 
section 72(4) read with Regulation 43 which mentions that one of the functions of the SEC is 
to monitor how the company’s activities affect non-shareholder constituencies. Other echoes 
of the enlightened shareholder value theory can be found in the remedial provision contained 
in section 218(2) which gives stakeholders some right of recourse in the event where the 
provisions of the Companies Act are contravened.174       
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 However, it is arguable whether section 72(4) read with Regulation 43 and section 
218(2)175 do indeed echo the enlightened shareholder value theory considering that the 
requirement to monitor non-shareholder constituencies is different from the prescript to legally 
recognise or to take their interests into account. Thus it follows that the theory adopted in the 
Companies Act is not in line with the recommendations made in the DTI policy document.
 Because of the adoption of this “in-between” approach, the theoretical underpinning of 
the SEC is in part the reason why section 72(4) is not a viable mechanism that can be enforced 
to ensure the protection of non-shareholder constituencies. Accordingly, it shall suffice to say 
that shareholder primacy has been retained in South Africa’s mandatory corporate law regime 
because the SEC’s prescript to monitor non-shareholder constituencies does not place a sui 
generis duty on directors. The duty to act in the best interests of the company is still owed to 
the shareholders in South Africa’s mandatory corporate law regime. 
2.5.3 The King Codes on Corporate Governance in South Africa 
In South Africa, the benchmark for good corporate governance is encompassed in the King 
Reports on Corporate Governance. To date, the King committee has published four codes of 
good practice to be adopted voluntarily by companies and other institutions operating in South 
Africa. However as mentioned before, the JSE makes it mandatory for listed companies to 
apply the recommendations of King the code if they are to maintain their listing on the JSE.176
 The first King Report, King I, was published in 1994 and advocated for effective 
communication with stakeholders.177 The King I Report recognised the importance of effective 
communication as a means of facilitating stakeholder protection.    
 The King II report built on the approach adopted in the first King report and 
acknowledged the shift from a single bottom line approach to a triple bottom line approach.178 
 The publication of the King III report, which came into effect in 2009, was necessitated 
by the enactment of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008.179       
Due to the significant corporate governance and regulatory developments locally and 
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internationally since King III was issued, an update to King IV was necessary.180 As such, King 
IV came into effect in 2017.          
 The foundation of all four King reports is based on ethical and effective leadership. And 
just like its predecessors, King IV advocates for stakeholder inclusive approach.181 This 
philosophical underpinning of King IV represents a stark departure from the shareholder 
primacy norm. King IV expressly advocates for a stakeholder approach in asserting that 
‘adopting the stakeholder-inclusive approach means that the best interests of the company are 
not necessarily always equated to the best interests of the shareholders’.182   
 The stance adopted in King IV endorses Esser’s recommendation to do away with 
interpreting the term ‘best interests of the company’ to mean the interests of the shareholders. 
According to Esser, the traditional interpretation of the term company will remain to be 
obscured for as long it equates or translates to shareholders.183         
2.6 Chapter Conclusion 
The enlightened shareholder value theory and stakeholder theory represent a slight trajectory 
from a shareholder primacy norm which only sought to be concerned with one corporate 
constituent, namely the shareholders. The accommodative nature of the enlightened 
shareholder and stakeholder theories are progressive in that they reflect a holistic attitude 
towards the management of corporate affairs.      
 However, the enlightened shareholder value theory is largely reminiscent of the 
shareholder primacy theory which makes it unworkable and inadequate to protect non-
shareholder constituencies. Furthermore, the enlightened shareholder value approach does not 
extend fiduciary duties to non-shareholder constituencies hence the absence of protection. 
 In this regard, it was submitted that the stakeholder theory, subject to certain 
adjustments, may present to be a better and workable philosophical underpinning for the SEC.
 This chapter demonstrated that the King Reports on Corporate Governance advocate a 
stakeholder theory. While an analysis of the Companies Act revealed that its drafters adopted 
a theory that is “in-between” the shareholder primacy theory and the enlightened shareholder 
value theory. As such, it was found that the theory adopted in the Companies Act is not in line 
with the one recommended by the DTI in the policy document.      
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 The next chapter will encompass an analysis of the structure and legal status of the SEC 
to address the categorical ambiguity of the SEC as either a sub-board committee or a separate 
organ of the company. This will be done to demonstrate how this ambiguity further negates the 
























CHAPTER 3: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE SOCIAL AND ETHICS COMMITTEE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation analysed how the philosophical foundation of the SEC negates 
the presence of a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to non-
shareholder constituencies.184 This has culminated in the poor drafting of section 72(4) read 
with Regulation 43.185 As such, the efficacy of the SEC is further negated by a lack of 
consensus regarding its appointment by either the board of directors or the shareholders.  
 The lack of consensus in this regard affects the committee’s legal status as either a 
board committee or a company committee. The ambiguity regarding the appointment of the 
SEC also affects the enforceability of section 72(4) read with Regulation 43 in that there is 
much uncertainty regarding which organ of the company is responsible for monitoring how the 
operations of the company impact non-shareholder constituencies. In this regard, there is also 
uncertainty regarding which organ of the company accountability can be imputed to. 
 This chapter will examine the legal status of the SEC by analysing the division of power 
in a company, and the SEC’s capacities and incapacities. This chapter will also provide an 
overview of the lack of consensus regarding the appointment of the SEC. This analysis is 
necessary to provide an answer to the research question, namely whether section 72(4) read 
with Regulation 43 is a legally viable mechanism that can be enforced to protect non-
shareholder constituencies. 
3.2 The Division of Powers in a Company as it Pertains to the Social and Ethics Committee 
As an artificial legal person, a company can only act through a medium of functionaries known 
as organs.186 Accordingly, the Companies Act confers the decision making authority, subject 
to the Act and Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI), on the two principal organs of the 
company, namely, the board of directors and the shareholders.187 These two organs execute 
such conferred authority subject to a decision-making framework in the form of meetings and 
by delegating authority.188        
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 Thus, the relationship between the directors and shareholders is governed by a division 
of power because section 66 of the Companies Act explicitly divides powers between the 
shareholders in the general meeting on one hand and the board of directors on the other hand.189
 To briefly outline this relationship, directors have an unfettered discretion to manage 
the business of the company and no shareholder may interfere with the board in doing so.190 
And although shareholders may not interfere in the management of the company, they 
appoint191 and they may dismiss directors.192  Accordingly, shareholders do not have the right 
to manage the business and affairs of the company.193 Thus, it follows that the business and 
affairs of the company must be managed by or under the direction of the directors.194 This, in 
turn, means that the ultimate power rests with the board of directors and not the shareholders 
unless indicated otherwise in the Act or the MOI.195      
 The division of powers in a company is important as it determines the powers and 
functions of the organs of the company.196 And in the context of the SEC, it determines which 
organ of the company is responsible for monitoring the impact of the company’s operations on 
non-shareholder constituencies and the basis upon which liability can be attributed.197  
3.3 The Lack of Consensus Regarding the Legal Status of the Social and Ethics Committee 
The lack of consensus regarding the appointment of the SEC arguably stems from nuances in 
Regulation 43.198 In terms of Regulation 43(2), reference is made to circumstances in which a 
company need not appoint an SEC. However, in terms of Regulation 43(3), reference is made 
to circumstances in which a board of directors is required to appoint an SEC. As such, it is 
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submitted that the difference in the wording used in Regulation 43 to refer to the company in 
one instance and then referring to the board of directors in another instance creates much 
uncertainty regarding the appointment of the SEC.        
 As a result, this ambiguity has led to a difference in opinion by various commentators 
regarding its appointment. According to Joubert, the SEC is a board committee based on the 
short title and overall context of section 72 of the Companies Act.199 Locke also categorises 
the SEC as a board committee by submitting that Regulation 43(2) and Regulation 43(3) must 
be read together to mean that the board of directors has the power to appoint the members of 
the SEC.200 As such, Rossouw submits that the best way to reconcile the nuances in the 
Regulations is for the company to categorise the SEC as a board committee by passing a 
resolution to that effect at the company’s first annual general meeting.201    
 In Henochsberg, it is argued that the SEC is a company committee because even though 
the reference in section 72 provides for board committees, in respect of the SEC, the references 
are that the company must appoint it.202      
 Stoop points out that the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission’s 
(Commission) intervention to convene a general meeting of shareholders in an instance where 
a company fails to appoint an SEC is indicative of the fact that it is a company committee.203 
However, Stoop mentions further that such intervention by the Commission may be necessary 
to assert the shareholder’s common law right to override an unresponsive board of directors.204 
 Esser and Delport are of the view that the SEC is a company committee because its 
discretion to be heard at a general shareholders meeting encapsulated in  section 72(8)(e) is 
wider than its responsibility to draw the board’s attention to certain matters in terms of in 
Regulation 43(5)(c).205          
 In this regard, Bouwman submits that the SEC’s discretion to report to the shareholders 
at a general meeting is merely aimed at enhancing disclosure and transparency and has no 
bearing on the SEC’s accountability to the board.206     
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 Based on the analysis above, it is submitted that the legal status of the SEC is a gray 
area in the law because there is uncertainty regarding which organ of the company is 
responsible for its appointment. The appointment of the SEC in Regulation 43 is not set out 
consistently and lacks clearly defined requirements. This is because the provisions setting out 
its appointment contains mixed characteristics of both organs of the company in that  
Regulation 43 refers to both the shareholders and the board of directors regarding the 
appointment of the SEC. 
3.4 The Importance of Making the Correct Categorisation of the Social and Ethics Committee’s 
Legal Status 
The arguments which have been advanced to support the categorisation of the SEC as either a 
board committee or company committee are all credible. However, it is unfortunate that 
between the Act and Regulations, neither provide any conclusive answers regarding its 
appointment.207          
 Nonetheless, whichever approach is followed has to be in line with the purposes set out 
in section 7(d) of the Companies Act, namely to ‘reaffirm the concept of the company as a 
vehicle for achieving social and economic benefits for the people of South Africa’.208 
 As such, it is important to provide a conclusive answer because if the SEC is categorised 
as a board committee, its members will be subject to fiduciary and statutory duties.209 However, 
if the SEC is categorised as a company committee, it will only be subject to the functions and 
powers stated in section 72(4) read with Regulation 43.210 Furthermore, the correct 
classification of the SEC is important to determine the type of relationship between it and the 
shareholders.211 
3.5 The Correct Understanding of the Social and Ethics Committee’s Legal Status 
As demonstrated above, an analysis of section 72(4) read with Regulation 43 can be construed 
to mean that the SEC can be categorised as either a board committee or a company commitee. 
Section 158(b(ii) of the Companies Act provides that if a provision in the Act can be interpreted 
to have more than one meaning, the meaning which promotes the spirit and purposes of the Act 
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must be preferred.           
 As such, based on the short title of section 72 and the overall context of Regulation 43, 
it is submitted that the SEC is a board committee.212 This is the interpretation which best 
promotes the purposes of the Companies Act espoused in section 5(1) read in conjunction with 
section 7; namely to comply with the provisions of the Bill of rights contained in the 
Constitution and to align the objectives of a company within the social realm in which it 
operates.213            
 As a board committee, the SEC will be subject to the common law fiduciary duties and 
statutory duties and these duties are thrust on non-director members of the SEC even if they do 
not have decision-making powers. 214 The common law and statutory fiduciary duties also 
extend equally to non-executive directors and executive directors who comprise the SEC in 
terms of Regulation 43(4).        
 Legally, there is no difference between executive and non-executive. It is an established 
practice, however, to classify directors according to their different roles on the board of 
directors. Executive directors are involved in the general day-to-day management of the 
company and usually serve on the board of directors as full-time salaried employees of the 
company.215 Non-executive directors, on the other hand, are not involved in the day-to-day 
management of the company.216 Despite the distinction between executive and non-executive 
directors drawn in practice, legally they all remain equally and collectively accountable for the 
board’s actions and decisions.217         
 However, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, these fiduciary duties are not owed to non-
shareholder constituencies because the phrase ‘best interests of the company’ remains to be 
exclusively synonymous with the interests of the shareholders.   
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3.6 The Viability of Section 72(4) Read with Regulation 43 as a Mechanism to Protect the 
Interests of Non-Shareholder Constituencies. 
While it is submitted in this dissertation that the legal status of the SEC is that of a board 
committee, it is further submitted that section 72(4) read with Regulation 43 is not a legally 
viable mechanism that can be enforced to protect the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies in the Companies Act.        
 This is because the phrase ‘best interests of the company’ is still construed to be 
synonymous with the interests of shareholders and as such, the SEC may only protect the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies in as much as they are in line with those of the 
shareholders.218           
 Be that as it may, a narrow interpretation of section 7(d) could warrant a wider meaning 
to the phrase ‘best interests of the company’ to include the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies.219 However, since non-shareholder constituencies are not provided with any 
direct rights or legal recognition in the Companies Act, this remains a matter for judicial 
interpretation.220 And unless the common law is either repealed by a competent body or it is 
declared invalid by a court of law, this phrase will remain to be interpreted as the collective 
interests of the shareholders.221        
 As such, the current formulation of section 7(d) read in conjunction with section 72(4) 
and Regulation 43 justifies the conclusion that the protection of non-shareholder constituencies 
is not sufficiently catered for by the Companies Act. 222 
3.7 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the uncertainty regarding the legal status of the SEC. It was found that 
this uncertainty arguably stems from the nuances found in Regulation 43. As a result of these 
nuances, there has been a lack of consensus in the literature available regarding the appointment 
of the SEC and consequently its legal status as either a board committee or a company 
committee.            
 It was submitted that the SEC is a board committee based on the overall context of 
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section 72 and Regulation 43. It was also submitted that the SEC is a board committee because 
this is the interpretation which bests promotes the purposes of the Act espoused in section 7(d) 
of the Companies Act.        
 Accordingly, the members of the SEC regardless of whether they are directors, non-
directors, executive directors or non-executive directors, they’re all subject to common law and 
statutory fiduciary duties. However, these fiduciary duties are not owed to non-shareholder 
constituencies because the phrase ‘best interests of the company’ remains to be exclusively 
synonymous with the interests of the shareholders.      
 Furthermore, it was found that section 72(4) read with Regulation 43 is not a legally 
viable mechanism that can be enforced to protect non-shareholder constituency interests.  This 
is because the provision of clarity regarding the legal status of the SEC will not suffice to ensure 
the protection of non-shareholder constituencies.      
 The next chapter will provide an analysis of the protection of non-shareholder 
constituencies in the United States of America and the United Kingdom to determine whether 
















CHAPTER 4: AN OVERVIEW OF NON-SHAREHOLDER CONSTITUENCY 
PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The protection of non-shareholder constituencies is a highly contentious topic and one which 
countries all over the world tackle.223 On the one hand, Anglo-American countries such as 
South Africa, the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) have 
maintained the shareholder primacy theory.224 While the stakeholder theory is dominant in 
many continental European countries such as Germany and East Asian countries such as Japan 
on the other hand.225          
 In the USA the protection of non-shareholder constituencies is provided by legal 
instruments commonly referred to as constituency statutes.226 Generally, constituency statutes 
explicitly permit directors to take non-shareholder constituencies into account during the 
decision-making process.227         
 In the UK it has been said that section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK Companies 
Act) arguably encapsulates the enlightened shareholder value theory and places a duty on 
directors to promote the success of the company whilst having regard to a non-exhaustive list 
of non-shareholder constituency interests.228      
 This chapter examines and compares the different models of non-shareholder 
constituency protection in the USA and UK to determine how the protection thereof is 
enforced. The main objective is to establish whether there are lessons to be drawn from the UK 
and USA models that may influence corporate law reform in South Africa. The first part of the 
analysis begins with the position in the US and this will be followed by an examination of the 
position in the UK.          
 The rationale behind this comparative approach is twofold. The first being that South 
Africa, the USA, and the UK are all common law jurisdictions and they also share similar 
economic and financial market systems.        
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 The second reason is that much of South Africa’s corporate law regime is to a large 
extent premised in English law (and Roman-Dutch law) therefore it forms a significant part of 
South Africa’s common law.        
 Furthermore, the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), the Delaware General 
Corporation Law (DGCL), the Maryland General Corporation Law (MGCL) and the UK 
Companies Act of 2006 has played a huge role in the development of the South African 
Companies Act 71 of 2008.229 As such, a comparative perspective that analyses how the USA 
and UK protect non-shareholder constituencies may be necessary for purposes of determining 
whether there are any lessons from which South Africa could learn. 
4.2 The Emergence of Constituency Statutes in the United States of America 
The constituency statutes refer to a part of a State’s statutory company law regime that governs 
the relationship between the company and its stakeholders. These legal instruments constitute 
a portion of the provisions which deal with the director’s duties230 and the overriding principle 
in most of them holds that directors owe their fiduciary duties to the company and its 
shareholders. 231  Thus it follows that the objective of the director’s core fiduciaries in the USA 
was and still is shareholder-centric.232       
 Before the constituency statutes were developed, there was uncertainty regarding 
whether it was legally permissible for directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies in their decision-making.233 In this regard, constituency statutes provide stability 
to inconsistent case law by expressly permitting directors to consider interests beyond those of 
the shareholders.234         
 Constituency statutes have been enacted in most American states and generally permit 
directors to take non-shareholder constituency interests into account without breaching their 
fiduciary duties.235 The first constituency statute was passed in Pennsylvania in 1983.236 Since 
then, constituency statutes have been enacted in over 40 American States with the notable 
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exception of Delaware.237        
 Hale observes that constituency statutes were enacted as a response to the hostile 
takeovers which rocked the corporate landscape in America during the 1980s.238 A takeover 
happens when a company (“the acquiring company”) makes a bid to the directors of another 
company (the target company) to buy it and both parties agree to the terms and conditions of 
the transaction.239 This situation becomes hostile when the bid is made despite objections from 
the board of directors.240         
 Back in the 1980s, takeovers were popular because shareholders stood to benefit from 
the transaction as the biding price was usually well over the share price compared to when the 
shareholders initially invested in the company.241 As such, directors were compelled to accept 
a handsome bid that was higher than the current market price of the company’s shares otherwise 
they risked breaching their legal duty to maximise shareholder wealth.242    
 The financial windfalls from takeover bids benefitted shareholders even though non-
shareholder constituencies suffered deleteriously.243 These hostile takeover era was blamed for 
extensive job losses and ruining the company’s relationships with its suppliers and 
customers.244 The hostile takeover were also blamed for the decimation of communities as they 
generally resulted in lost charitable and social donations from which communities benefitted 
when companies operated in their hometowns.245        
 As a consequence of the adverse effects which the takeovers had on non-shareholder 
constituencies, some states enacted constituency statutes to provide directors with a “legal tool” 
to oppose a takeover.246 Constituency statutes were thus developed as tools for directors to 
reject a takeover bid rather than as tools to empower non-shareholder constituencies.247 
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 Accordingly, certain states such as Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
and Tennessee limit the application of constituency statutes to takeover scenarios, however, a 
majority of the constituency statutes in other states do not have this limited scope of 
applicability.248          
 Notably in Delaware, the state in which the majority of companies are incorporated in 
the USA, the legislature has not enacted a constituency statute.249 This is perhaps the reason 
why South Africa is still shareholder-centric considering that its company law is largely 
influenced by the Delaware Corporate regime. 
4.3 The Constituency Statutes Vary Across the Different American  States  
The states that have enacted constituency statutes generally follow a similar pattern with a 
unifying principle that permits directors to consider non-shareholder constituency interests.250   
However, there are important variations in the constituency statutes amongst the various states 
that relate to several issues such as whether shareholder interests trump non-shareholder 
constituency interests.251 Another variation concerns whether permission to consider non-
shareholder constituency interests are extended to the board of directors or a committee of the 
board. 252 The final variation that will be analysed in this dissertation pertains to whether the 
consideration of non-shareholder constituencies is discretionary or mandatory.253   
 It is important to highlight how the constituency statutes vary across the states to 
provide a framework for their analysis and to examine the similarities and differences between 
the South African and American models. A critical analysis of all the variations is, however, 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
4.3.1 The Primacy of Stakeholder Interests   
The first variation concerns whether shareholder interests are to be given primacy over non-
shareholder constituency interests. This issue goes to the heart of the shareholder-stakeholder 
debate because it addresses the objective of the company and it seeks to establish the 
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beneficiaries of fiduciary duties.254       
 Delaware law is arguably the leading authority in the development of corporate law and 
is looked to by other American states to determine the extent of the director’s fiduciary 
duties.255 Delaware case law primarily from the mid-1980’s maintained that fiduciary duties 
are owed exclusively to the company and the shareholders collectively.256 In Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, the Supreme Court of Delaware determined that ‘in carrying out their managerial 
roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its 
shareholders’257 Later that same year, the same court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co 
permitted directors to consider non-shareholder constituency interests for the first time albeit 
in takeover circumstances.258          
 Following the two cases mentioned above, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that the consideration of non-shareholder 
constituencies must be rationally connected to the shareholder’s interests.259 Put differently, 
the court determined that non-shareholder constituency interests have to be concurrent with 
shareholder interests.         
 Although the cases mentioned above were decided in a takeover context, a fundamental 
tenet of Delaware common law was and still is shareholder primacy.260 In this regard, 
constituency statutes do not represent a radical departure from the shareholder primacy norm 
however, it appears that they do erode the shareholder primacy norm by expressly permitting 
directors to consider non-shareholder constituencies.261 Further to this, there is no provision in 
the constituency statutes that provides that the directors fiduciary duties are owed exclusively 
to shareholder interests.262         
 To demonstrate, Indiana’s statute expressly provides that ‘directors are not required to 
consider the effects of a proposed corporate action on any particular corporate constituent 
group or interest as a dominant or controlling factor’.263 Further to this, the Indiana statute also 
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expressly rejects the Delaware judicial precedents (presumably laid out in Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc) which advance 
shareholder primacy and profit maximization in a takeover context.264   
 In the US, it appears to be settled that non-shareholder constituency interests may be 
taken into account insofar as they are concurrent with shareholder interests.265  Thus it appears 
that the US position leans more towards an enlightened shareholder value approach albeit in a 
shareholder centric space.         
 In South Africa on the other hand, non-shareholder constituencies have not received 
formal recognition in the Companies Act because there is no statutory pronouncement on the 
issue.266 However, there are various provisions in the Companies Act such as Section 5 read 
with section 7 and section 72(4) which arguably advocate for a stakeholder inclusive approach. 
 Further to this, in Stilfontein Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold 
Mining Co Ltd 267, Hussien J found that non-compliance with the principles entrenched in the 
King Reports on Corporate governance (which advocate for a stakeholder inclusive approach) 
may lead to directorial liability for breaching the duty of care and skill.268   
 In this case, the court found that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty to act 
bona fide in the best interests of the company. And although the court did not link the breach 
of the director’s fiduciary duty and the application of King Report, subsequent judgements in 
the same vein may lead the way for the provisions of the King Reports to find their way into 
jurisprudence to become part of South Africa’s common law.     
4.3.2 The Extension of Permission to Consider Non-Shareholder Constituency Interests. 
The second variation pertains to whether the consideration of non-shareholder constituencies 
is extended to either the board of directors or board committees. In most states, the respective 
constituency statute specifically extends the permission to consider non-shareholder 
constituency interests to directors.269 In other states, permission is extended to both the board 
of directors and /or committees of the board.270       
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 For example, section 1715 of the Pennsylvanian constituency statute specifies that ‘the 
board of directors, committees of the board and individual directors of a business corporation 
may… consider the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors 
of the corporation, and upon communities’.271 In Wyoming however, the duty to consider non-
shareholder constituency statutes is extended to directors only.272    
 The position in South Africa is similar to the Pennsylvanian statute. Section 72(4) of 
the Companies Act places the consideration of non-shareholder constituency interests within 
the ambit of the SEC-a board committee. The question that comes to mind pertains to whether 
there are any differences between placing the consideration of non-shareholder constituency 
interests within the ambit of the board of directors versus delegating this authority to a board 
committee.           
 When the duty to consider non-shareholder constituencies is extended to the board of 
directors, decisions to protect these corporate constituents are taken at an executive level.273 
When this authority is delegated to a board committee, on the other hand, such a committee 
can provide specialised knowledge to the rest of the board.274 And as a result, the board of 
directors is better informed because the committee has superior knowledge regarding the 
protection of non-shareholder constituencies.275       
 While there are practical differences between extending the duty to consider non-
shareholder constituency interests to the board of directors as opposed to a board committee, 
there are no legal consequences of doing so because the board remains responsible for the 
proper performance of delegated tasks.276 
4.3.3 The Mandatory versus Discretionary Consideration of Stakeholder Interests 
The third variation concerns whether the duty placed on directors to consider non-shareholder 
constituency interests is mandatory or discretionary. Some constituency statutes place a 
mandatory duty on directors to consider non-shareholder constituency interests while others 
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merely make such consideration discretionary.277 A mandatory duty means that a director must 
take the various interests into account in the decision-making process whereas a discretionary 
duty means that the directors will have to make a judgement call in that regard.278  
 The constituency statute in Idaho makes it mandatory for directors to consider non-
shareholder constituency interests.279 The statute employs the word shall as opposed to may.280 
As such it follows that a director may incur liability for failing to consider the interests of a 
particular non-shareholder constituent.281       
 It has been argued that a mandatory prescript on directors to consider non-shareholder 
constituency interests sets the tone for managerial opportunistic behaviour. According to Keay, 
directors could make self-serving decisions disguised as an act of balancing the various 
stakeholder interests and no one could challenge the conclusion at which the directors 
arrived.282           
 Nonetheless, most of the other states leave the consideration of non-shareholder 
constituency interests to the discretion of directors. For example, the Minnesota constituency 
statute provides that ‘in discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may, in 
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the corporation's 
employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, 
community and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders including the possibility that these interests may be best served 
by the continued independence of the corporation’.283      
 The Florida constituency statute also gives directors discretion to consider non-
shareholder constituency interests.284 Both Florida and Minnesota statutes employ the word 
may which implies that directors have wider discretion in carrying out their responsibilities to 
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the company.285          
 In South Africa, the position is unclear because, as mentioned previously, there is no 
statutory pronouncement on the issue in the Companies Act. Section 72(4) read with 
Regulation 43 of the Companies Act does not provide clarity as to whether the mandate to 
monitor how the operations of the company impact non-shareholder constituencies is to be 
done in a mandatory or discretionary fashion by the SEC.286     
 However, the provision does provide that only certain companies are required to 
appoint an SEC.287 From this, we can deduce that the consideration of non-shareholder 
constituency interests could be either mandatory for prescribed companies only.   
 This assertion is merely speculative because Regulation 43 explicitly provides that the 
SEC is required to monitor the company’s standing as it pertains to non-shareholder 
constituencies.288 The provision does not prescribe whether the mandate to monitor is 
mandatory or discretionary. And as mentioned previously, it is also not clear whether the 
requirement to monitor non-shareholder constituencies is the same as considering their 
interests.           
 Be that as it may, the fact that the JSE requires listed companies to provide an annual 
account of how the operations of the company impact on society and the environment (in 
compliance with King IV Report on Corporate Governance) implies that the consideration of 
non-shareholder constituency interests is not discretionary for listed companies in South 
Africa. 
4.4 The Enforceability of Constituency Statutes    
Although non-shareholder constituencies are the intended beneficiaries of constituency 
statutes, none of the constituency statutes provide a mechanism to enforce the rights afforded 
by the statutes.289 Put another way, constituency statutes fail to provide non-shareholder 
constituencies with enforceable rights which means that should directors fail to take their 
interests into account when managing the affairs of the company, there is no basis upon which 
                                                             
285 FL ST § 607.0830(3) and M.S.A. § 302A.251 respectively. See also Janette Meredith 
Wester ‘Achieving a Proper Economic Balance: Non-shareholder Constituency Statutes’ 
(1990) 19 Stetson Law Review 2 at 615. 
286 My emphasis. 
287 Section 72(4)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
288 Reg 43(5)(a) of the Companies Regulations. 
289 Op cite note 237 at 14. 
54 
 
accountability can be attributed 290        
 To demonstrate, some statutes such as the ones in Nevada and New York explicitly 
deny non-shareholder constituencies with legal standing to enforce the rights which the 
constituency statutes purport to afford them. For example, the Nevada statute provides that the 
consideration of non-shareholder constituencies does ‘…not create or authorize any causes of 
action against the corporation or its directors... .’291 The New York statute encapsulates a 
similar provision albeit in less simple terms by providing that the consideration of non-
shareholder constituency interests shall not create any duties owed by the director to them.292
 The absence of an enforcement mechanism is a consequence of the notion that 
shareholders are the sole beneficiaries of the director’s fiduciary duties.293 As a result, 
shareholders are the only stakeholders who can institute derivative action proceedings on 
behalf of the company against errant directors.294      
 In South Africa however, the introduction of the statutory derivative action contained 
in section 165 of the Companies Act arguably gives employees (through a trade union 
representative or another representative) locus standi to institute derivative action proceedings. 
Further to that, section 218 of the said Act also gives non-shareholder constituencies some right 
of recourse against errant directors for any loss or damage suffered as a contravention of the 
Act.295            
 Be that as it may, due to the fact that non-shareholder constituencies have not received 
formal recognition in the Companies Act, it is unlikely that South African courts will interpret 
these provisions in such a way that disregards the shareholder primacy norm.  
4.5 An Assessment of the of Constituency Statutes   
Constituency statutes have been criticised for their lack of precision in that they do not provide 
directors with guidance regarding how they are to give attention to non-shareholder 
constituency interests.296 The argument is that the constituency statutes require directors to 
balance competing interests without providing any means of weighing and measuring the 
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different interests which they are required to take into account.297  Further to that, it has been 
argued that constituency statutes create “too many masters” in that they make it difficult, if not 
impossible, for directors to satisfy all of the different and competing interests.298 And 
consequently, the directors are not accountable to anyone.     
 In addition to the lack of precision, Hanks contends that the constituency statutes create 
an unspecified relationship between the company and non-shareholder constituencies that 
entitles them to claim from the residual wealth of the company.299 According to Hanks, non-
shareholder constituencies are not only able to claim in terms of their statutory and contractual 
arrangements with the company, but they can also claim (again) along with the shareholders 
from whatever is left after winding up the company.300 This essentially redistributes the 
shareholder’s wealth to the non-shareholder constituencies without providing a standard for 
doing so.301           
 Critics of the constituency statutes also claim that these statutes fail to establish the 
corporate objective and the beneficiary of the director’s fiduciary duties.302 As such, 
constituency statutes fail to define the phrase ‘best interests’ of the company.   
 However, proponents of the constituency statutes hold that the phrase can be interpreted 
to mean the wide spectrum of stakeholder’s interests whereas opponents of the statutes interpret 
this phrase to mean the collective interests of the shareholders.303    
 Wallman submits that defining what the best interests of the company are is a 
cumbersome task.304 However, this difficulty is reduced when the phrase is examined in light 
of the company’s ability ‘to produce wealth indefinitely’.305 The phrase connotes the wealth-
generating activities of today and tomorrow for the benefit of all stakeholders.306   
 As such, much of the tension that would result from competing interests is reduced 
when the phrase ‘best interests of the company’ is interpreted to refer to the interconnectedness 
of the various stakeholder interests.307        
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 According to Mitchell, the criticisms levelled against the constituency statutes are based 
on a misconception of the director’s fiduciary duties which has been exacerbated by 
inconsistent case law.308 Mitchell submits that the director’s fiduciary duties are multifaceted 
and are designed to address a multitude of conflicts of interests.309 Fiduciary duties are not only 
designed to ensure that directors maintain their duty of loyalty to the shareholders which 
requires them to maximize shareholder wealth.310 Instead, the duties are also designed to 
prevent directorial self-dealing and to protect the separate legal personality of the company.311 
 The director’s duties were not designed to solely benefit one specific group of 
stakeholders.312 The purpose and significance of the fiduciary duties are to benefit the company 
as represented by the various stakeholder interests.313 Further to this, Mitchell contends that 
the corporate objective and the intended beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties are blurred 
by the indiscriminate mismatching of the duties to cater exclusively to the shareholder’s 
interests.314            
 The arguments that have been advanced to criticise constituency statutes are credible 
in that these instruments may not be the perfect solution to offer American non-shareholder 
constituencies protection because of the absence of an enforcement mechanism. However, the 
legal recognition of these stakeholders afforded by the constituency statutes represents a step 
in the right direction nonetheless.         
 It is unfortunate that in South Africa, employees are the only non-shareholder 
constituency with (indirect) locus standi to institute derivative action proceedings. However, it 
is submitted the extension of this locus standi reveals an inconsistency in the Companies Act 
because it is not coupled with a duty that legally recognises employees (and other non-
shareholder constituencies) with enforceable rights to enforce recommendations set out by the 
SEC.            
 The second part of this chapter analyses the recognition and protection of non-
shareholder constituencies in the UK to determine whether this model is more favourable to 
non-shareholder constituencies. 
                                                             









4.6 The Shareholder Value Theory in the United Kingdom 
Similarly to the US and South Africa, the UK has maintained the shareholder primacy norm as 
a key component of its company law and ultimately the corporate objective of companies 
operating in the UK. Some of the earliest judicial pronouncements regarding the maximisation 
of shareholder wealth were made as early as 1885 in Harris v North Devon Railway Co where 
the court equated the interests of the company to with those of the shareholders.315  
 Although the judgement delivered in Hutton v West Cork Railway also maintained the 
shareholder primacy norm, this case indicated that a wider approach to conducting corporate 
affairs is plausible when the court stated that, ‘[t]he law does not say that there are to be no 
cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of 
the company’.316 The ‘cakes and ale’ analogy indicates that directors may take non-shareholder 
constituency interests into account in so far as such consideration ultimately benefits the 
company and the shareholders. Further to that, this analogy also (arguably) denotes to the 
quintessence of the enlightened shareholder value theory. 
4.7 The Emergence of the Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach in the United Kingdom 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, a fundamental review of UK company law was 
undertaken by an independent committee known as the Company Law Review Steering Group 
(CLRSG).317 The CLRSG was an independent group established by the UK Department of 
Trade and Industry (UK DTI) whose aim was to develop a simple, modern, efficient, and cost-
effective framework for conducting business affairs in Britain.318    
 Similarly to the South African DTI, the CLRSG identified two theories (enlightened 
shareholder value theory and stakeholder holder theory) to address the issue of whose interests 
should be taken into account by directors when managing the affairs of the company.319 The 
CLRSG noted that business affairs should be conducted in a manner that enhances the interests 
and welfare of different groups in society. However, it also went further to note that is important 
not to turn directors into moral, political or economic arbitrators.320   
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 The CLRSG rejected the stakeholder theory and noted that it was unworkable because 
it would necessitate substantial reform on the law on the director’s duties and is thus 
undesirable in the UK.321 According to the CLRSG, the ultimate objective of a company is to 
generate wealth for the shareholders.322 As such, the CLRSG opted for the enlightened 
shareholder value theory as a better way of achieving wealth generation and competitiveness 
for the benefit of all.          
 The CLRSG explained the enlightened shareholder value theory as an approach 
whereby directors would be required to achieve the success of the company for the benefit of 
the shareholders whilst striking a balance between the different competing interests of the 
employees, community, suppliers, customers, and others.323 The CLRSG also made note of the 
importance of maintaining effective relationships with these stakeholders.   
 The UK government responded to the CLRSG’s recommendations by enacting a 
statutory version of the enlightened shareholder value approach (with slight variations) in 
section 172 of the Companies Act 2006. 324 
4.8 Section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 
Section 172(1) of the UK Companies Act places a duty on directors to consider a non-
exhaustive list of non-shareholder constituency interests when discharging their duty to 
promote the success of the company.325 The interests which the directors are to have regard to 
include, but are not limited to, those of the employees, suppliers, customers, community and 
the environment.326 Section 172(1) requires directors to consider these interests in good faith 
and in such a way that promotes the success of the company, which as demonstrated before, 
has been interpreted to mean the collective interests of the shareholders.   
 It is submitted that the language used in section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 
bears much resemblance to the ‘cakes and ale’ analogy referred to in Hutton v West Cork 
Railway in that the provision only implores directors to consider non-shareholder 
constituencies provided that such consideration promotes the interests of the shareholders.
 The language used in section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 also bears a lot of 
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resemblance to the US constituency statutes. Both of the legal instruments used in these two 
countries to protect non-shareholder constituencies explicitly place a duty on directors to take 
non-shareholder constituencies into account when discharging their duties to the company.
 This is different from the position in South Africa because the language in section 72(4) 
of the Companies Act read in conjunction with Regulation 43, namely the requirement to 
‘monitor’ non-shareholder constituencies, creates much uncertainty regarding whether there is 
a similar duty placed on directors.  
4.9 An Analysis of the Prescribed Factors in Section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 
As mentioned previously, section 172(1)(a)-(d) requires directors to have regard to the interests 
of employees, suppliers, customers, and community amongst others when promoting the 
success of the company for the benefit of shareholders. In this regard, there is little controversy 
over the consideration of the non-shareholder constituencies provided in the list because it 
reflects wide expectations of responsible business behaviour.327     
 It is, however, peculiar to note that creditors have been omitted from the list even 
though one category of creditors-suppliers- is mentioned.328  In this regard, Keay submits that 
creditors have been omitted because they are offered protection to some extent by section 
172(3).329 He further contends that section 172(3) is reflective of the principles developed in 
case law that seek to protect the creditors of a company in financial distress. 330  
 While USA constituency statutes and section 172 of the UK Companies Act provide a 
statutory list of non-shareholder constituencies to be considered by directors, the comparable 
provision in South Africa, section 72(4), merely provides for the establishment of the SEC with 
its functions set out in the Companies Regulations.      
 Further to that, the SEC’s mandate to monitor the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies is stated in equivocal terms. The Regulations merely implore prescribed 
companies to monitor the company’s standing as it pertains to various international corporate 
governance conventions and local labour laws such as the Employment Equity Act and the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act.331  
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4.10 Shareholder Primacy is retained in Section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 
Similarly to the position in the USA and South Africa, shareholder primacy still is a 
fundamental tenet of UK company law.332 Therefore describing section 172 of the Companies 
Act of 2006 as an embodiment of the enlightened shareholder value theory creates the 
impression that it is a different concept from the shareholder primacy theory.333 And although 
it can be argued that section 172 of the UK Companies Act prima facie deviates from the 
shareholder primacy norm, Esser and Delport contend that shareholder holder primacy has been 
retained.334           
 Further to this, Keay submits that section 172 makes it clear that the directors owe their 
duties to the company and shareholders, not the wide range of non-shareholder constituency 
interests listed in sub-sections (a)-(d). Thus, ‘the overall effect of section 172(1) is that 
enlightened shareholder value can be interpreted as shareholders first interpretation’.335  
 According to Keay, the only enlightened aspect of section 172 appears to be the 
recognition of non-shareholder constituency interests.336 As such, section 172 of the 
Companies Act of 2006 does not add anything new to English company law because this is a 
similar approach adopted in cases such as Hutton v West Cork Railway Co.  
 Thus, it would seem inaccurate to refer to section 172 as a radical departure from the 
shareholder primacy theory.337 Although the essence of the provision accommodates the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies, it fundamentally embodies elements of the 
shareholder primacy theory.338 
4.11 The Enforceability of Section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 
A key concern regarding section 172(1) pertains to what happens when directors merely pay 
lip service to the factors listed in section 172(1)(a)-(d) and they fail to consider non-shareholder 
constituencies. Put differently, this concern relates to the rights of recourse (if any) that may 
be available to non-shareholder constituencies.      
 Unfortunately, similarly to the USA constituency statutes, shareholders are the only 
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stakeholders who can enforce a breach of duty by the directors.339 Shareholders in the UK can 
bring a derivative suit against the directors on behalf of the company in terms of section 260(2) 
of the Companies Act of 2006 (subject to leave from the court).340 The position in South 
Africa is different because the right to institute derivative action proceedings embodied in 
section 165 of the Companies Act is also extended to employees (and other non-shareholder 
constituencies provided that a legal interest is proved).    
 Furthermore, it is important to note that section 260(3) of the Companies Act of 2006 
limits the circumstances in terms of which shareholders can institute a derivative suit. These 
circumstances are limited to  ‘a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act or 
omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the 
company’.341  
4.12 An Assessment of the Comparative Overview 
It has been argued that section 72(4) of the Companies Act is in effect the South African 
statutory adoption of the enlightened shareholder value theory.342 However, the shortcomings 
of this provision render it inadequate to recognise and protect non-shareholder constituencies. 
And so, it is questionable whether section 72(4) does in fact give effect to the enlightened 
shareholder value theory. Further to that, the way the provision is drafted promotes a tick box 
culture343 that emanates from the word monitor employed in Regulation 43(5(a).  
 The standard constituency statute bears some resemblance to the UK’s statutory 
embodiment of the enlightened shareholder value theory.344 And although these two legal 
instruments offer legal recognition to non-shareholder constituencies, they do not offer them 
protection because there is no provision for a mechanism to enforce the legally recognised 
rights. Thus, it follows that both the USA and the UK instruments still promote the shareholder 
primacy norm albeit through the lens of non-shareholder constituencies.   
Accordingly, the American constituency statutes and section 172 of the Companies Act 
of 2006 do not fundamentally add anything new to what a director is already obligated to do. 
At best, these legal instruments point the way towards a more stakeholder centric approach345 
                                                             
339 Section 260(1) of the Companies Act of 2006.  
340 Section 178(2) of the Companies Act of 2006. 
341 Section 260(3) of the Companies Act of 2006. 
342 Op cite note 65 at 523. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Op cite note 147 at 79.  
345 Op cite note 345 at 37. 
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because the discretion given to directors to have regard to non-shareholder constituency 
interests arguably disrupts the traditional focus of exclusive shareholder wealth 
maximization.346            
 Be that as it may, the legal mechanisms contained in section 172 and the constituency 
statutes provide stability to inconsistent case law.347 As previously mentioned, this is because 
at common law, it was unclear whether directors were legally permitted to take non-shareholder 
constituencies into account when managing the affairs of the company however, section 172 
and the constituency statutes expressly permit directors to take non-shareholder constituency 
statutes into account in their decision-making.  
 The constituency statutes and section 171 have also been criticised for a lack of clarity 
and guidance regarding how directors are to weigh, prioritize and reconcile the various non-
shareholder constituency interests.348 On that note, it is arguable whether these legal 
instruments offer non-shareholder constituencies with any real benefits.349 Further to that, non-
shareholder constituencies have very little power to influence directors to make decisions that 
protect their interests.350         
 The most far-reaching concern regarding section 172 and the constituency statutes is 
perhaps that they fail to provide non-shareholder constituencies with a mechanism to hold 
directors accountable.351 Thus it appears unlikely that they can successfully institute 
proceedings against directors on the basis that they failed to have regard to non-shareholder 
constituency interests during the decision-making process.352 
4.13 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter examined and compared the different models of non-shareholder constituency 
protection in the UK and USA to determine whether there are any lessons from which South 
Africa could learn.          
 It was found that the protection of non-shareholder constituencies is afforded by 
statutory legal instruments known as constituency statutes in the USA and in the UK, protection 
is conferred by section 172 of Companies Act of 2006. These legal mechanisms explicitly 
                                                             
346 Op cite note 134 at 611. 
347 My emphasis. 
348 Op cite note 261 at 42.  
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid. 




permit directors to consider non-shareholder constituencies when conducting the affairs of the 
company.            
 The USA constituency statutes differ in certain regards across the different states but 
they all generally permit the consideration of non-shareholder constituencies as a unifying 
factor. In the UK, section 172 of the UK Companies Act encapsulates the enlightened 
shareholder value theory which has been described as an amalgamation of shareholder primacy 
theory and the stakeholder theory.        
 Although section 172 and the constituency statutes statutorily permit directors to 
consider non-shareholder constituency interests, they have been criticised for their lack of 
precision and the absence of an enforcement mechanism that non-shareholder constituencies 
can use to enforce their legally recognised rights. In that regard, many of the arguments that 
have been levelled against the stakeholder theory have also been advanced against the 
constituency statutes and section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006.   
 The comparable provision in South Africa, namely section 72(4) of the Companies Act 
read in conjunction with Regulation 43, merely implores prescribed companies to monitor how 
the operations of the company impact non-shareholder constituencies, the provision does not 
extend legal recognition to non-shareholder constituencies.      
 However, the indirect locus standi extended to employees (and to a certain extent other 
non-shareholder constituencies) in section 165 of the Companies Act offers some right of 
recourse to institute proceedings on behalf of the company. Be that as it may, it is unlikely that 
section 165 will offer much assistance to non-shareholder constituencies unless the ambiguities 
and shortcomings in section 72(4) are cleared up to formally and unequivocally recognise non-
shareholder constituency interests in the same way section 172 of the Companies Act of  2006 
and the constituency statutes have. 
 The outright extension of enforceable rights to non-shareholder is a cumbersome task 
fraught with many shortcomings, uncertainties, and ambiguities. This process would require 
the formulation of a normative theory that is beyond the scope of this thesis.    
 To reflect the paradigm shift towards stakeholder protection undertaken in the USA and 
UK, South Africa will have to formally and unequivocally recognise non-shareholder 
constituencies as corporate constituents in the Companies Act in a similar fashion. Be that as 
it may, it must be borne in mind that that the paradigm shift undertaken in the USA and UK is 
hardly a radical departure from the shareholder primacy norm, but it is nonetheless a step that 
can be taken to bring South Africa in line with international standards.    
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 However, caution should be exercised when transplanting solutions from developed 
countries such as the USA and the UK to a developing country such as South Africa. In this 
regard, a paradigm shift that advocates for a bespoke committee that recognises non-
shareholder constituencies may be a better and more appropriate solution for South Africa’s 






















CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examined how shareholders continue to be the only stakeholders to hold a 
privileged position in the governance of companies in that they enjoy they are the sole 
beneficiaries of the directors’ fiduciary duties. However, it was also submitted that the 
exclusive focus on shareholder protection is a narrow approach to conducting the affairs of the 
company because the interests of shareholders are given primacy at the expense of non-
shareholder constituency interests.         
 The paradigm shift towards an approach that seeks to recognise and protect non-
shareholder constituencies is arguably reflected (with limited application) in section 72(4) of 
the Companies Act read with Regulation 43 of the Companies Regulations. These provisions 
require certain companies to appoint an SEC.       
 The presence of a structured committee such as the SEC in a company serves as a useful 
tool that companies can use to monitor how the operations of the company impact a broad 
range of non-shareholder constituencies including employees, the environment, communities, 
and suppliers. The role of the SEC in a company is also to ensure that CSR objectives are 
embedded in the core of the company’s activities and strategies to add value beyond making 
profits.             
 In this regard, it was found that the SEC presents an ideal conduit through which it can 
sensitize the board of directors to issues of national priority and to ensure that the company 
does not fall foul of the provisions of the Bill of Rights prescribed by section 7 read with section 
5 of the Companies Act.         
 This dissertation examined how several shortcomings and uncertainties gravely 
undermine the efficacy of the SEC. It was found that the inefficacy of the SEC stems from a 
plethora of shortcomings and uncertainties that emanate from the legislature’s poor formulation 
of section 72(4) of the Companies Act read with Regulation 43. The Companies Act and 
accompanying Regulations refer to generic terms of reference regarding the role and 
responsibilities of the SEC. Further to that, the powers, functions, objectives, and purpose of 
the SEC are not made clear.         
 On that basis, it was submitted in this dissertation that the SEC’s greatest flaw is the 
absence of an enforcement mechanism that arguably stems from the legislature’s requirement 
for certain companies to monitor as opposed to consider or protect non-shareholder 
constituency interests. The use of the word monitor implies that the SEC is merely required to 
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keep a record of how the company’s activities impact non-shareholder constituencies and to 
observe whether the company’s CSR activities are carried out correctly. As such, the SEC’s 
mandate to monitor how the operations of the company impact non-shareholder constituencies 
do not afford them formal recognition and legally enforceable rights in the Companies Act.
 Further to that, it was also submitted that the efficacy of the SEC is negated by a lack 
of consensus regarding its appointment. According to the literature review conducted 
pertaining to the legal status of the SEC, it was found that there is a lack of consensus regarding 
whether the SEC is appointed by either the board of directors and is thus a board committee, 
or whether it is appointed by the shareholders and is accordingly a company committee. 
  In response to the research question raised in this dissertation, it was submitted that 
based on the short tile of section 72(4) of the Companies Act read in conjunction with 
Regulation 43, the SEC is a board committee because this is the interpretation that best 
promotes the purpose provisions contained in section 5 read with the section 7 of the 
Companies Act, namely to reaffirm the concept of a company as a vehicle for attaining social 
objectives and the concomitant national issues of priority.     
 In this regard, it was submitted that the director’s fiduciary and statutory duties apply 
to directors, non-directors, executive, and non-executive directors who comprise the SEC. 
However, these duties are not owed to non-shareholder constituencies because the shareholders 
are the exclusive beneficiaries of the director’s duties. On that basis, it was found that section 
72(4) read with Regulation 43 is not a viable mechanism that can be enforced to protect non-
shareholder constituencies.        
 This dissertation also demonstrated how the inability of the SEC to protect non-
shareholder constituencies is a direct consequence of its philosophical foundation. During 
South Africa’s company law reform process, the DTI recommended the enlightened 
shareholder value theory as the philosophical foundation of the new Companies Act and 
consequently the SEC.        
 However, an analysis of the Companies Act revealed that the theory adopted is unclear, 
but it was suggested that the approach adopted by the legislature is perhaps one that is “in-
between” the shareholder primacy theory and enlightened shareholder value theory. This 
analysis was based on the fact that the only echoes of the enlightened shareholder value theory 
in the Companies Act are to be found in section 72(4) read with Regulation 43 and section 218 
of the Companies Act.         
 In the comparative analysis encompassed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, it was 
submitted that  the USA and the UK have also deliberated on the shareholder value theory, the 
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enlightened shareholder theory and the stakeholder theory as the theories to be adopted as the 
philosophical foundation of the company law regimes of these two countries.  
 It was found that in the USA, the protection of non-shareholder constituencies is 
afforded by statutory instruments known as constituency statutes. An examination of the 
constituency statutes found that they vary across the different USA States but they all generally 
permit directors to consider non-shareholder constituencies in their decision-making as a 
unifying factor.           
 In the UK, the protection of non-shareholder constituencies is conferred by section 172 
of Companies Act of 2006. A comparison between the US Constituency Statutes and section 
172 of Companies Act of 2006 revealed that both legal instruments explicitly permit directors 
to consider non-shareholder constituencies when conducting the affairs of the company. It was 
also found that in the UK, section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 is said to encapsulate the 
enlightened shareholder value theory which has been described as an amalgamation of 
shareholder primacy theory and the stakeholder theory.     
 It was submitted that although the two legal instruments in the USA and the UK referred 
to above offer non-shareholder constituencies legal recognition, they do not afford them legal 
protection because neither legal instruments make provision for a mechanism to enforce the 
legally recognised rights. In this regard, it was submitted that both instruments promote the 
shareholder primacy norm albeit through a stakeholder lens and is thus is insufficient to 
protect the rights of non-shareholder constituencies.      
 The comparative analysis also revealed that the position in South Africa’s is not 
different to the one in the USA and UK because the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), 
the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), the Maryland General Corporation Law 
(MGCL) and the UK Companies Act of 2006 has played a huge role in the development of the 
South African Companies Act 71 of 2008. And on that basis, it was submitted that the 
shareholder primacy norm has also been retained in South Africa.    
 Nonetheless, the position in South Africa is slightly different in that the indirect locus 
standi extended to employees (and other non-shareholder constituencies with legal standing 
and leave from the court) pursuant to section 165 of the Companies Act offers some right of 
recourse to institute derivative action proceedings on behalf of the company. However, due to 
the absence of legally recognised rights in the Companies Act that can be enforced, it is unlikely 
that section 165 will offer much assistance to non-shareholder constituencies. In this regard, to 
improve the efficacy of the SEC, the following recommendations are submitted: 
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5.2 Recommendations  
It is hereby recommended that to reflect a similar paradigm shift undertaken in the USA and 
the UK to protect non-shareholder constituencies, South Africa will have to formally and 
unequivocally recognise non-shareholder constituencies as corporate constituents in the 
Companies Act in a similar fashion.        
 However, caution should be exercised because it may be inappropriate to directly 
transplant the solutions adopted in developed countries such as the USA and the UK to a 
developing country such as South Africa. On this note, it is submitted that the South African 
legislature should work towards formulating a paradigm shift that advocates for a bespoke 
committee that recognises non-shareholder constituencies with enforceable rights. This can be 
achieved by a legislative amendment of section 72(4) read with Regulation 43.   
 In the first instance, section 72(4) of the Companies Act should be amended to expressly 
provide that the mandate of the SEC is to consider and not monitor the interests of legitimate 
and identifiable non-shareholder constituencies, namely, employees, communities, suppliers, 
and the environment when promoting the success of the company.     
 Secondly, it is submitted that clarity should be provided regarding the appointment of 
the SEC. In this regard, section 15 of the Companies Act Amendment Bill of 2011 should be 
passed as law. Section 15 proposes that the SEC should be appointed by the incorporators of 
the company or by the board of directors within 40 days of the company’s incorporation. As 
such, this proposed amendment is in line with Rossouw’s recommendation on how to reconcile 
the nuances between Regulation 43(2) and Regulation 43(3).   
 Thirdly, the reference to international corporate governance instruments such as the 
United Nations Global Compact principles and the OECD recommendations regarding 
corruption in Regulation 43(5) should be amended to refer to local instruments such as King 
IV Report on Corporate Governance as suggested by Kloppers.    
 Finally, it is submitted that the “merry-go-round” theory coupled with the derivative 
action formulated by Esser would be a useful tool for directors regarding how they are to weigh 
and balance the competing stakeholder interests. 
5.2 Areas for Future Research 
Despite the recommendations made above, it is further submitted the legislative amendments 
to section 72(4) read with Regulation 43 will not suffice to offer substantive protection to non-
shareholder constituencies. However, the substantive protection of non-shareholder 
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constituencies can be achieved by the legal recognition of non-shareholder constituencies as 
corporate constituents coupled with enforceable rights in the Companies Act.  
 It must, however, be borne in mind that this is a cumbersome task fraught with many 
shortcomings, uncertainties, and ambiguities. Accordingly, such a process would require the 
development of a normative theory that would provide the basis for the attribution of 
responsibilities to members of the bespoke committee suggested above and thus presents as an 
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